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ARTICLES
COOPERATION AND DIVISION: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF VOTING SIMILARITIES AND




The Stable Rehnquist Court Era (SRCE) covers the period from the
appointment of Justice Breyer to the passing of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
There has been only one longer period of stability in the Court’s history,
and that was in the early nineteenth century when far fewer cases were
decided.  Because the composition of the Court held constant for so long,
the SRCE presents a unique opportunity to conduct a statistical analysis
of the Justices’ votes.  I present a statistical empirical analysis of voting
for this period, both for the potentially interesting results and as an ex-
ample of how to conduct and present an empirical study which is objec-
tive and replicable.  Some of the findings include the following: only a
few pairs of Justices have statistically significant differences in voting
records; the magnitude of the departure from independent voting is enor-
mous in statistical terms; Justice Thomas is the most predictable Justice;
and Justice Scalia is the least-changed Justice.  Of particular interest is
a finding that is contrary to conventional wisdom.  Conventional wisdom
suggests that the median Justice closest to the center, presumably Justice
Kennedy, is the most influential Justice.  However, I have developed a
measure of influence which employs the statistically significant effects
the Justices have on each other, and this suggests that the most influen-
tial Justices on the Court during the SRCE were Rehnquist, Souter, and
Breyer.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade, a sizeable and respectable community of
legal scholars have sought to bring a more rigorous and scientific type of
approach into legal research.1  Undoubtedly, this is motivated in part by
a feeling that legal scholarship has softer standards than other social sci-
ence scholarship that requires such scholars to follow a more scientific
approach—developing and using mathematical models and statistical
methods—in order to achieve promotion and tenure.2  Most legal schol-
ars do not work with data or statistics and do not test hypotheses; hence,
their results are not subject to the same level of peer scrutiny as those of
social scientists, since there are no results to scrutinize.3  Most legal
scholarship consists of persuasive arguments using legal authority and
sometimes empirical results borrowed from other fields.4
This Article adds to the growing volume of empirical legal literature
with an analysis of the voting behavior of the nine United States Su-
preme Court Justices during what I refer to as the Stable Rehnquist Court
Era (SRCE), which began with the appointment of Justice Breyer and
1 See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83
N.C. L. REV. 167, 168 (2004) (citing several prominent legal scholars calling for more empiri-
cal and scientific legal research); Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory,
Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 876
(2002) (advancing the argument that legal scholarship has become more scientific).
2 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 125–26
(2002) (observing that other disciplines do not count non-peer reviewed articles towards pro-
motion and tenure and therefore do not take legal scholarship seriously).
3 See id. at 9 (suggesting that most law professors do not receive adequate training in
statistical inference and hypothesis testing).
4 Cf. David M. Flores et al., Examining the Effects of the Daubert Trilogy on Expert
Evidence Practices in Federal Civil Court: An Empirical Analysis, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 533, 536
(2010) (“While Daubert and its progeny inspired an abundance of literature in the legal com-
munity, only a small proportion of this work represents systematic research directly examining
the effects of the changes in admissibility standards.”) (footnote omitted).
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concluded with the passing of Justice Rehnquist.5  In an effort to make
the approach more like other social sciences, I collected data, established
a methodology for analysis, and I now report the results for others to
scrutinize and either replicate or dispute.6  The analysis contains some
complex models and hypothesis tests, but it also contains simple empiri-
cal measurements that are informative.
Some of the results are not surprising.  For example, four of the
Justices’ votes have a negative correlation with conservative outcomes,
two have a weak positive correlation with conservative outcomes, and
three have a strong positive correlation with conservative outcomes.7
Which Justices fall into which category will not come as a surprise to
legal scholars.8  Nevertheless, there is value in having a meaningful
quantitative measure of the magnitude of conservatism which confirms
our rough judgments.9  There is also value in knowing the precise magni-
tudes of certain variables even if our knowledge of relative rankings is
not shaken.10  For example, it will be no surprise to scholars of the Court
that Justice Stevens is the most contrarian Justice measured by frequency
of sole dissents.11  But it might not be widely known that Justice Stevens
5 See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The New Religion, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 399, 399
(2007) (stating that when Justice O’Connor retired in 2006, Justice Breyer was just “a couple
months shy of the record for the longest serving junior justice in American history.”).
6 The data is contained in an Excel spreadsheet which I will make available upon re-
quest following publication.  The statistical analysis was conducted using an econometric sta-
tistical package called Shazam, version 7.0. See generally KENNETH J. WHITE, SHAZAM: THE
ECONOMETRICS COMPUTER PROGRAM VERSION 7.0 USER’S REFERENCE MANUAL 1–71,
255–60, 317–22 (1993) (covering features of the computer program used in generating this
study).
7 See infra Table 2.
8 See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal
and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1150, 1155, 1174–75 (2004) (classifying Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer as more liberal; Justice Kennedy and O’Connor as moderate; and Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Thomas as conservative).
9 See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 81, 97 (2006) (discussing the need for “the most precise measure possible” to
determine how ideology drives the votes of the Justices).
10 See generally Mark Klock, Finding Random Coincidences While Searching for the
Holy Writ of Truth: Specification Searches in Law and Public Policy or Cum Hoc Ergo
Propter Hoc?, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1007, 1015–22 (2001) (explaining that a descriptive statistic
is really an estimate of a population parameter which is only useful if we have information
about the magnitude of the sampling error) [hereinafter Klock, Finding Random
Coincidences].
11 See Jeff Bleich et al., Justice John Paul Stevens: A Maverick, Liberal, Libertarian,
Conservative Statesman on the Court, OREGON STATE BAR BULLETIN (Oct. 2007), http://www.
osbar.org/publications/bulletin/07oct/stevens.html (“Justice Stevens frequently demonstrates a
penchant for sole concurrences and dissents.”); John Paul Stevens, OYEZ PROJECT AT CHI-
CAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_paul_stevens (“Stevens’ in-
dividualistic personality keeps him permanently outside the mainstream of the Court and . . .
he lacks the characteristics of a coalition-builder.”) (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
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had more sole dissents during this period than the other eight Justices
combined, or that he had more than five times as many sole dissents as
the second most contrarian Justice—Justice Thomas.12  By comparison,
Justice O’Connor was the sole dissenter in just a single decision during
the SRCE.13  Another finding that is not surprising is that the two Jus-
tices most frequently known as the swing votes in close decisions14 have
the highest batting averages, defined as voting with the majority.15  Hav-
ing a precise quantitative measure, however, enables us to have a better
understanding as to how important the votes of Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy were relative to the other members of the Court during the
SRCE.16  Indeed, some of the empirical models suggest that when we
examine the influence the Justices have on one another, the two swing
vote Justices do not have the most influence on the Court, contradicting
some of the conventional wisdom.17
Part I of this Article discusses the power and limits of empirical
analysis.  Part II describes three alternative models of voting: indepen-
dent, cooperative, and vindictive.  Part III describes the data collection
process and provides some background into statistical methodology.  Fi-
nally, Part IV presents the empirical results.
I. POWER AND LIMITS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Power of Empirics and Our Thirst for Facts
Empirical facts are difficult to dispute.18  For example, the fact that
Ted Williams was the last player to bat .400 during a major league sea-
12 See infra Table 2 and accompanying text (1.25% of 80 sole dissents is one).
13 Id.
14 See Theodore W. Ruger et al., supra note 8, at 1184 (indicating that as moderates,
O’Connor and Kennedy are often the swing votes); see also C. Lincoln Combs, Note, A Curi-
ous Choice: Hibbs v. Winn as a Case Study of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s Balancing
Jurisprudence, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 197 (2005) (referencing Justice O’Connor’s “status as
the swing vote between the conservative and liberal voting blocs on the Court . . . ”); Jennifer
S. Hendricks, Converging Trajectories: Interest Convergence, Justice Kennedy, and Jeannie
Suk’s “The Trajectory of Trauma,” 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 63, 65 (2010) (observing
“Justice Kennedy’s status as the swing vote.”).
15 See infra Table 2.
16 See infra Table 4 (showing that Justice Kennedy’s voting percentage is not signifi-
cantly different from Justice Rehnquist’s or Justice Souter’s statistically, and that Justice
O’Connor’s voting percentage is not statistically significantly different from the aforemen-
tioned Justices and Justice Breyer).
17 See infra Table 7 and the accompanying discussion (concluding that the Justices with
the most positive net influence on the Court were Justices Rehnquist, Souter, and Breyer).  The
conventional wisdom is that swing voters are the most powerful. See Lee Epstein & Tonja
Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 40 (2008) (“[I]n theory the median Justice should
be quite powerful . . . .”).
18 By definition, a fact is something known to be true, “something that has actual exis-
tence.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fact
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
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son cannot be disputed.19  Legal decisions, however, are disputable.20
This explains not only the existence of appeals, but also the need to have
a terminal court so that all disputes eventually come to an end.21  The
power of empirical measures lies in their perceived ability to resolve dis-
putes.22  As constraints on financial and political resources have become
more intense, the stakes in policy debates have become greater.23  The
forces of supply (inexpensive computational power and data storage)24
and demand (the strong desire to have the most persuasive facts available
to win a high stakes debate) have worked to bring the power of empirics
into battle.25
The growth in empirical legal studies has been explosive.26  In
2002, Professors Epstein and King claimed that empirical research had
become commonplace among legal scholars during the previous two de-
cades.27  To support their empirical observation they reported that 231
papers with the word “empirical” in the title were published in American
19 Fred Bowen, .400: A Disappearing Magic Number, WASH. POST, June 27, 2008, at
C12.
20 See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HI-
JACKED ELECTION 2000 at 81 (2001) (“The majority per curiam opinion [in Bush v. Gore] is
likely to become one of the most analyzed, criticized, and defended opinions in the history of
the Supreme Court.”).
21 Cf. Mark Klock, Is it the “Will of the People” or a Broken Arrow? Collective Prefer-
ences, Out-of-the-Money Options, Bush v. Gore, and Arguments for Quashing Post-Balloting
Litigation Absent Specific Allegations of Fraud, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 17 (2002) (observing
that there is value in decisively and conclusively terminating endless disputes) [hereinafter
Klock, Bush v. Gore].
22 Cf. MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS x (2d ed.
2001) (“[I]t seems inevitable that studies based on data will continue to be pursued by the
scholarly community and presented with increasing frequency in litigated matters involving
public issues.”).
23 See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, Evidence-Based Access to Justice, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 295, 310 (2009) (“It is critically important that resource allocation decisions . . . are
made accurately because the stakes are high.”).
24 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at x (“What is true of the general world has
filtered into the courtroom. . . .  [T]he ubiquity of data and computers, and the current fashion,
have encouraged the creation of elaborate econometric models that are sufficiently plausible to
be accepted in learned journals.”).
25 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 9 (6th ed. 2012) (“From
economists, lawyers can learn quantitative reasoning for making theories and doing empirical
research.”).
26 See Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of
the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1136
(2010) (“[T]here has been a veritable explosion of empirical research about federal judges
. . . .”); Michelle M. Mello & Kathryn Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of
the Field, 96 GEO. L.J. 649, 651 (2008) (“In recent years, the field of empirical legal studies
has grown exponentially.”); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Schol-
arship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 142 (2006) (documenting the rise in empirical
legal scholarship).
27 Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 1.
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law reviews during the eleven year period from 1990 to 2000.28  In the
subsequent period from 2001 to 2011, no fewer than 904 such papers
were published in the same traditional printed law reviews, and many
more were disseminated electronically.29
Professors Epstein and King were motivated to analyze empirical
research in the legal community because of their observation that schol-
ars were making unsupported inferences in their empirical research.30  A
decade later, that point is still worth discussing, but first it is worth step-
ping back and asking what is driving the explosion in empirical legal
research.  The supply forces are easy to see.  We have experienced mark-
edly lower costs in information collection, storage, and retrieval.31  We
have also experienced dramatically lower costs of computational
software and computing power.32  There are also more empirical re-
searchers with better training in empirical research methodology.33
The increased demand for empirics is more subtle and difficult to
document, but nevertheless something which would be commonly agreed
on.  By definition, empirical means working with observed data or exper-
imental observations.34  Observations and data are facts.35  The infer-
ences researchers make based on them might be flawed and not factual,
but empirical research essentially involves collecting factual information
28 Id. at 15–16.
29 A search on Lexis-Nexis on August 8, 2012 for law review articles with “empirical” in
the title published between 2001 and 2011 listed 904 publications.  The same search for just
the previous three years in the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) yielded 2,865 elec-
tronic abstracts and manuscripts.
30 See Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that their comprehensive review of
law review articles found that all of them had at least one mistake in their rules of inference
without exception).
31 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 20–21 (1999) (“[W]ith recent advances in information technology,
the cost of distributing information is falling . . . .  Information delivered over a network in
digital form exhibits the first-copy problem in an extreme way: once the first copy of the
information has been produced, additional copies cost essentially nothing.”).
32 See, e.g., James Lindgren, Predicting the Future of Empirical Legal Studies, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 1447, 1453 (2006) (“With today’s computing power, most statistical analyses are
almost instantaneous.  In 1968, a single multiple regression analysis took all summer to do on
a calculator.  Now the same analysis would usually take less than a second to do on an ordi-
nary laptop.”); David Colander, New Millennium Economics: How Did It Get This Way and
What Way Is It?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 131 (2000) (observing that computing costs have
dropped).
33 See Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life’s Golden Tree: Empirical Scholar-
ship and American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 58 (2006) (“Law professors today do more
empirical research than ever before.  This is partly because there are many more scholars under
much more pressure to do much more scholarship.”).
34 See Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 2 (“The word ‘empirical’ denotes evidence about
the world based on observation or experience.”).
35 See id. at 3 (“[D]ata . . . is just a term for facts about the world.”).
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and using it to draw conclusions.36  Forty years ago it might have been
acceptable to make the argument that spending more money on teachers’
salaries would improve the performance of school children without any
supporting facts.37  In the current environment, however, arguments that
lack supporting data are easily dismissed.38  We have come to expect and
require data to support requests for resources.39
How does the state of empirical legal research compare with a dec-
ade ago?  There has been much progress, but the legal community is still
far behind researchers in the social and natural sciences.40  Progress can
be seen through the increase in law school faculty with Ph.D.s who have
extensive training and experience in research methodology.41  Progress
can also be seen by the increase in law school course offerings and cross-
listed courses covering statistical inference and quantitative methods.42
However, these are still not commonplace.43  Law school remains the
only professional program which does not require statistics in the curric-
ulum.44  Researchers using empirical methods and quantitative models
36 Cf. Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1016 (“Statistical infer-
ence is the process of making inferences about a population based on a sample.”).
37 See Harold M. Baron, Race and Status in School Spending: Chicago, 1961–1966, 6 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 3, 20 (1971).
38 See Caroline M. Hoxby, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students
and Taxpayers?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1209, 1236–37 (2000) (empirical research has shown that
it is not increased spending that leads to higher achievement in students but rather the increase
in school choices).
39 See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 631 (2007)
(suggesting that empirical analysis of costs and benefits should be conducted before changing
election laws).
40 See Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical
Studies, Part II, 60 VAND. L. REV. 801, 846 (2007) (observing that law professors are increas-
ingly using data and performing quality work, but still are behind the social and statistical
sciences in effective communication of empirical results).
41 Cf. George, supra note 26, at 152 (creating a ranking of the top forty law schools
based on the proportion of tenure-track faculty with a doctorate in a social science, a ranking
that did not exist earlier, presumably due to the lack of a substantial number of law faculty
with doctorates in social sciences).
42 See Seth Freeman, Bridging the Gaps: How Cross-Disciplinary Training with MBAs
Can Improve Transactional Education, Prepare Students for Private Practice, and Enhance
University Life, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 102–03 (2008) (remarking on major
commitments to cross-disciplinary training at NYU Law School, Stanford Law School, and
University of Pennsylvania Law School).
43 See Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the Business
Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 388 (2009) (observing that although law students
can take business classes at most institutions, they seldom do).
44 See Steven B. Dow, There’s Madness in the Method: A Commentary on Law, Statis-
tics, and the Nature of Legal Education, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 579, 579 (2004) (“Professional
legal education is unique among all of the university graduate-level programs in the natural
and social sciences in not requiring at least a basic level of competency in statistics and quanti-
tative methods.”); Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1063 (remarking
that statistics is required in other professional schools such as business and education).
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continue to make mistakes and the consumers of empirical research
methods appear not to catch them.45
To take one example, a recent paper by William Landes and Rich-
ard Posner uses regression analysis to examine whether aspects of judi-
cial behavior might be predictable based on observable variables.46
Their dependent variable is the fraction of conservative votes in non-
unanimous cases.47  The variable is logically constrained to lie between
zero and one, but using ordinary regression can yield predicted values
which are negative or greater than one.48  Hence an alternative methodol-
ogy should have been used, or at least there should have been discussion
about the potential flaws in the methodology.49
B. Limits to Empiricism
Although empirical analysis can be powerful and many of us en-
courage more of it, there are limits to empiricism.50  Some scholars do
not understand the limits and thus conduct their empirical research
poorly.51  Some scholars expect too much from data without a theory, or
from theories that do not specify the precise form of the function that
45 See, e.g., Mark Klock, Contrasting the Art of Economic Science with Pseudo-Eco-
nomic Nonsense: The Distinction Between Reasonable Assumptions and Ridiculous Assump-
tions, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 153, 157–61 (2010) (taking one law professor to task for using a
quantitative economic model to prove a desired result when the model contained inherently
ridiculous and logically flawed assumptions) [hereinafter Klock, Contrasting Economic
Science].
46 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 775–76 (2009).
47 Id.; Table 3 at 782.
48 One way to understand the nature of the problem is to consider that ordinary regres-
sion often assumes normally distributed random variables underlying the model. See FINKEL-
STEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 405 (“[I]t is frequently assumed that data are normally
distributed . . . .”).  Since the logical range of the dependent variable is bounded by the interval
zero to one, a random variable with a normal distribution is impossible. See also, Jeff Yates &
Elizabeth Coggins, The Intersection of Judicial Attitudes and Litigant Selection Theories: Ex-
plaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 263, 292 n.98
(2009) (acknowledging a potential problem using ordinary least squares when the dependent
variable is a proportion bounded by zero and one).
49 An alternative methodology would be truncated regression. See CHRISTOPHER F.
BAUM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ECONOMETRICS USING STATA 259 (2006) (“I now dis-
cuss a situation where the response variable is not binary or necessarily integer but has limited
range. . . .  Modeling LDVs [limited dependent variables] by OLS will be misleading.”) (intro-
ducing discussion of truncated regression).  It is certainly possible that this alternative method-
ology would not have produced different results, but without robustness tests or revelation of
more details of the ordinary regression results we cannot ascertain this.
50 See Nancy C. Staudt & Tyler J. VanderWeele, Methodological Advances and Empiri-
cal Legal Scholarship: A Note on Cox and Miles’s Voting Rights Act Study, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 42, 46 (2009) (“[A]ll empirical researchers, must make assumptions about their
data before estimating causal relationships and reporting empirical results.”).
51 See id. (“While empirical researchers must, and always do, make assumptions about
their data, these assumptions are almost always left unstated.”).
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relates the dependent variable to the explanatory variables.52  For exam-
ple, multiple regression analysis is one of the most commonly utilized
empirical models.53  Results of multiple regression have been introduced
into evidence in countless trials.54  A standard piece of rote memory
from Ph.D. programs is that regression produces the “best linear unbi-
ased estimates,” and most doctoral students are taught the mathematical
proof of this.55  But the proof requires several assumptions, one of which
is that the true model is known and is correctly specified.56  So, if Y is in
reality created by Model I, which is Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + e, and we
instead estimate Model II, which is Y = a + b1X1 + e, the regression
estimates of b1 will not be the best linear unbiased estimates.57  Yet there
are few, if any, situations in the social sciences where we can state with
certainty that we know the true model a priori.58  This causes other
scholars to become disillusioned with empirical research and to devote
time to criticizing it.59
Most educated people do not believe in alchemy.60  Yet when it
comes to empirical analysis and statistical models, many believe that
something akin to alchemy is possible.61  They believe that if a lot of
data and numbers are fed into a computer, some black box alchemy-like
process enables the computer to spew forth answers to important ques-
tions.62  Will interest rates and gold prices rise or fall?  Which potential
52 See id. (“[Empirical] authors . . . must presume that . . . some . . . set of relationships
exists when specifying a model and interpreting the estimates from a regression . . . .”).
53 See Richard Scheines, Causation, Statistics, and the Law, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 135, 159
(2007) (“When the measure of association used is correlation, then by far the most commonly
used statistical technique for adjusting for confounders is multiple regression.”).
54 See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987) (“[T]his Court has accepted
statistics in the form of multiple-regression analysis . . . .”).
55 See, e.g., Mark Thomas, Material for Lecture I on Tuesday 1/4/11, Economics 421 –
Econometrics, http://economistsview.typepad.com/economics421/lectures/ (last visited Nov.
12, 2012) (covering the assumptions required for regression estimates to be best linear unbi-
ased (BLU) and the Gauss-Markov Theorem).
56 See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 66 (3d ed. 1995) (explaining that
the model must be correctly specified).
57 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1057 (excluding relevant
variables will result in biased estimates).
58 See id. at 1023 (suggesting that experts never know the true model with certainty).
59 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism
and Theory in Legal Scholarship, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1139, 1163 (2002) (“Legal scholarship
is not primarily about empirical prediction. . . .  [T]he key distinction of legal scholarship is its
normative character.  Legal scholarship is addressed to legal decision makers, with particular
emphasis on judges who ‘speak the same language’ of the legal scholar.”).
60 See David F. Hendry, Econometrics—Alchemy or Science?, 47 ECONOMICA 387, 387
(1980) (describing the pejorative connotations of alchemy).
61 Cf. Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1008 (“[C]ommentators
and reporters frequently give too much weight to statistics and treat them as actual facts rather
than mere estimates which might not be valid or reliable for inferential reasoning.”).
62 See id. at 1064 (“Statisticians are not alchemists and cannot create information out of
thin air any more than they can create gold out of iron.  They can feed numbers into a com-
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jurors will vote to convict a criminal defendant or award large damages
to a plaintiff?  It should seem obvious that there is no computer or pro-
cess that can provide accurate answers to such questions without input-
ting all of the information required to correctly answer them.  There is an
old adage in computer modeling that translates as inputting garbage pro-
duces output that is garbage.63  Yet many people have the expectation
that if we just put large enough amounts of garbage data into the com-
puter, the computer will somehow miraculously produce high quality
output.64
Professors Epstein and King refer to this belief in miracles as reifi-
cation.65  They observe that individuals reify numbers and treat them as
something unalterable from a divine source, when the numbers are often
merely rough approximations.66  We might estimate the mean value of a
distribution to be one, but if our 95% confidence interval around that
estimate ranges from zero to two, then we do not have a very precise
estimate of the mean.67  Yet individuals will focus on the value of one as
the correct value, ignoring the fact that it is no more than a crude
approximation.68
The problem becomes much more complex when we attempt to
condense a multi-dimensional concept into a one-dimensional measure-
ment.69  Intangible concepts, such as liberal and conservative, involve
many dimensions, and efforts to create a simple ordinal measure of these
concepts to rank Justices as more or less conservative inherently involve
puter and get numbers out, but the ingredients for valid information in the output must be in
the input.”); Edward E. Leamer, Let’s Take the Con Out of Econometrics, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
31, 33 (1983) (“It would be a remarkable bootstrap if we could determine the extent of the
misspecification from the data.”); id. at 36 (“[D]ata alone cannot reveal the relationship . . . .”).
63 See THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOTT, REGRESSION: A SECOND
COURSE IN STATISTICS 93 n.10 (1987) (describing the “garbage in, garbage out” approach).
64 Cf. Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron Experience: Will It Be Regula-
tion of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability?, 28 J. CORP. L. 69, 73 (2002) (ex-
plaining that the precise information people seek is often impossible to get because the
calculations require estimates of future events, which cannot be confirmed in the present)
[hereinafter Klock, Two Possible Answers].
65 See Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 28 & n.71 (“Reification is one of the oldest
statistical mistakes on record.”).
66 Cf. id. at 28 (describing how a group of empirical legal researchers created a profile of
an average juror without any evidence that this profile represented “a majority of jurors, a few
jurors, or any jurors at all”).
67 Cf. Fischer Black, The Trouble with Econometric Models, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-
Apr. 1982, at 29, 34 (“Even the best forecasts may not be very good.”).
68 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1016 (“People have a
strong tendency to treat statistics and estimates as if they are the actual values . . . .”).
69 See Mark Klock, Financial Options, Real Options, and Legal Options: Opting to Ex-
ploit Ourselves and What We Can Do About It, 55 ALA. L. REV. 63, 109 (2003) (“[Measure-
ment of] a multidimensional concept . . . cannot be implemented without creating an arbitrary
and capricious scale.”) [hereinafter Klock, Financial Options].
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some arbitrary decisions.70  If a Justice votes to strike down a law against
protesting too close to an abortion clinic, is that a liberal vote for protect-
ing the First Amendment or a conservative vote for empowering abortion
protestors?71  What if some conservative Justices vote to declare the law
unconstitutional for the purpose of furthering a conservative cause of
supporting abortion protestors, but use a liberal cause of free speech to
justify the result?72
This limitation of quantitative measures can be seen more easily
with more concrete examples, such as risk and size.73  Risk has two
dimensions: the probability of being different and the magnitude of the
difference.74  Imagine two different games.  The first game pays you a
dollar if a fair coin flip comes up tails and two dollars if it comes up
heads, for an average payout of $1.50.  The actual payout is always dif-
ferent from $1.50, but only by fifty cents.  Another game pays you $1.49
99.9898% of the time and $100 0.0102% of the time.  This game will
nearly always pay the same amount, but has a very small chance of pay-
ing a lot more.  It is not obvious which game is riskier since one has a
high probability of a small difference while the other has a low
probability of a large difference.75  Measures of risk can be constructed
that will make the first game seem riskier, and measures of risk can be
constructed that will make the second game appear riskier, but the choice
of risk measure is arbitrary.76
Size is commonly measured by weight, length, and volume.77  For
different purposes and different types of objects, one measure might
seem superior to others.78  However, if we are attempting to order differ-
ent objects by size, choosing a specific dimension might create a strange
70 See Klock, Two Possible Answers, supra note 64, at 95 (explaining that mapping mul-
tidimensional concepts into a one-dimensional measure is problematic because there is no
unique mapping form).
71 Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714–16 (2000) (presenting the question of the
constitutionality of a Colorado law restricting free speech in close proximity of health care
facilities, including abortion clinics).
72 Cf. id. at 741 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (voting to declare restriction on
speech near abortion clinics unconstitutional).
73 See Klock, Two Possible Answers, supra note 64, at 95 (using risk and size to illus-
trate the difficulty of creating a consistent single ordering based on multiple attributes).
74 See id.
75 Cf. id. at 95–96 (giving a similar example where one distribution has a larger
probability of being different from the average value, while the other has a larger probability
of deviating from the average value by a greater amount).
76 Cf. id. at 96 (explaining that the choice of which distribution is riskier is arbitrary).
77 See id. at 95 (“Size can involve attributes such as length, width, thickness, mass, and
volume.”).
78 For example: wrestlers are grouped by weight class; rope is measured by length; milk
is sold by volume.
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ordering.79  One solution is to create a measure of size that combines
weight, length, and volume.80  This solution comes with its own problem
though.81  Once we use our new measure of size to describe objects, we
lose all of the other information contained in the three original mea-
sures.82  Furthermore, our method of combining the measures is arbi-
trary, and different methods of combining weight, length, and volume
into a size measure will result in different orderings of the objects by
size.83
Legal scholars have developed an appetite for quantitative empirical
research.84  Law generates a lot of data, and much of that data has not yet
been subjected to quantitative analysis, which provides many interesting
research opportunities.85  Some scholars have advocated for a change in
the traditional model of producing legal scholarship with a move towards
peer-reviewed publications rather than student-edited publications.86
There is a substantial body of literature criticizing and defending the law
review model.87  Professor Gregory Mitchell suggests a more practical
solution.88  He argues that the value added by the peer review process is
79 See Klock, Financial Options, supra note 69, at 109 (giving a similar example regard-
ing sorting policies by fairness).  As stated there:
[T]o evaluate whether a policy is more fair or less fair, we need to measure fairness.
Two key principles of fairness are to treat equals equally and to treat unequals un-
equally.  There is an immediately obvious tension between these principles when we
recognize that people are similar and different in many dimensions and any classifi-
cation system for individuals is necessarily arbitrary.  Evaluating policies on fairness
is like sorting heterogeneous objects from biggest to smallest without any clear pur-
pose underlying the ordering.
Id.
80 See id. (“We could arbitrarily sort based on weight, height, displacement, or any arbi-
trarily chosen function combining these aspects of size.”).
81 See id. (“The ordering will of course be dependent on arbitrary choices.”).
82 See Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 81 (describing the loss of information that neces-
sarily occurs when creating a measure).
83 See Leamer, supra note 62, at 38 (describing how inferential reasoning often rests on
whimsical assumptions).
84 See Susan Saab Fortney, Taking Empirical Research Seriously, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1473, 1474–75 (2009) (commenting on the burgeoning field of empirical legal stud-
ies); Elizabeth Chambliss, When Do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for “Em-
pirical Legal Studies,” 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2008 at17, 22–23 (2008)
(describing dramatic growth in empirical legal studies); George, supra note 26, at 141 (calling
empirical legal scholarship the “next big thing in legal intellectual thought”).
85 Cf. Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1741, 1746 (2004) (“Across a broad range of legal issues, empirical studies can inform
policymakers and the public.  Legally trained social scientists have unique opportunities to
enhance description and understanding of the legal system.”).
86 See Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 127–28.
87 See generally, Cameron Stracher, Reading, Writing, and Citing: In Praise of Law Re-
views, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 349 (2008) (discussing and refuting criticism of article selec-
tion by law reviews).
88 See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 176 (suggesting “an alternative approach to improving
empirical legal scholarship that may be more feasible than a move to peer review”).
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objectivity rather than validation.89  He suggests that an easier way to
obtain objectivity in the generation of empirical analysis is through strict
disclosure requirements.90  I follow this approach by disclosing the data
and details of the methodology.  I consider this investigation to be a
model demonstrating how to collect data, analyze data, and report mean-
ingful results.
II. MODELS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR
For reasons I will elaborate on later, without strong prior informa-
tion, empirical analysis might not be capable of identifying the correct
model of voting.91  People often expect too much from data and statisti-
cal analysis.92  Nevertheless, it is useful to have some models of voting
behavior to provide a rough frame for the empirical analysis.93
This Article considers three distinct, but not mutually exclusive,
models of voting: independent, cooperative, and vindictive.  Economists
usually assume that individual economic agents, such as households or
voters, have a set of preferences that are independent of each other.94  On
some level, it might seem that this assumption is clearly false.95  People
89 See id. at 175 (arguing “that the primary benefit of peer review lies in its objectivity-
forcing function: peer review compels the disclosure of important information about empirical
research using a common methodological language so that the research may be subjected to
critical scrutiny.”).
90 See id. at 176 (“[L]aw reviews can force objectivity into empirical legal scholarship by
adopting a set of stringent disclosure requirements for reports of original empirical research,
including disclosure of detailed information about methodology, data analysis, and the availa-
bility of raw data for replication and review.”).
91 See Leamer, supra note 62, at 36 (“[D]ata alone cannot reveal the relationship . . . .
[W]e must resort to subjective prior information.”).
92 See Klock, Two Possible Answers, supra note 64, at 94 (suggesting that people expect
statistical estimates to reveal the truth even though they cannot).
93 See Mark Klock, Are Wastefulness and Flamboyance Really Virtues? Use and Abuse
of Economic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 195 n.88 (2002) (remarking that “[f]acts alone
cannot explain events,” and a theory or model helps explain a set of facts) [hereinafter Klock,
Wastefulness].
94 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Nature of Man, in THE NEW CORPORATE FINANCE:
WHERE THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 4, 5 (Donald H. Chew, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1999) (stating that two
assumptions commonly employed in the model of utility maximizing households are prefer-
ence for more over less and independence of preferences across households).
95 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government,
75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 954–55 (1990).  In criticizing the economic model of individual prefer-
ences, Professor Hovenkamp writes that:
It treats legislators something like children selecting a single flavor of ice cream to
be shared by all.  Each child’s preferences are strictly individual, and there is gener-
ally no reason to prefer the preferences of one child over those of another.  Likewise,
the children do not take the strengths of one another’s preferences into account.
Id. at 955.
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give money to charities and they share with relatives.96  Some econo-
mists and biologists, however, believe that such giving is still motivated
by self-interest.97  There is selfishness when one gives to influence the
perceptions of others about one’s self; when one gives to feel good; and
when evolutionary forces might induce people to give to relatives and
communities to improve the chances that one’s own genes, or genes very
similar to one’s own, survive.98  Whether this assumption is correct or
not, however, is not as important as whether it is a reasonable first ap-
proximation.99  All models distort reality to some degree.100  The art of
good model building is to use assumptions that simplify some of the less
important complexities of reality in order to highlight other relationships
without grossly distorting those relationships.101  The standard economic
assumption of independence of preferences makes the mathematical
analysis of such models more tractable.102
Some lawyers might be quick to suggest that independence of vot-
ing in the context of the Supreme Court is ridiculous since the Justices
discuss the cases together and vote with the junior associate Justice vot-
ing first and the Chief Justice voting last.103  If voting preferences are
independent, why bother to discuss the case and attempt to persuade
others, and why attach so much importance to the order of voting?  On
the other hand, such discussion may merely be a mechanism by which
independent voters form their own decisions, as if they are talking out
loud to themselves and considering and weighing all of the issues; just as
registered voters listen to campaign debates, speeches, and commercials
96 See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, SUPERFREAKONOMICS: GLOBAL COOL-
ING, PATRIOTIC PROSTITUTES, AND WHY SUICIDE BOMBERS SHOULD BUY LIFE INSURANCE 104
(2009) (“We all witness acts of altruism, large and small, just about every day.”).
97 See Arthur J. Robson, The Biological Basis of Economic Behavior, 39 J. ECON. LITER-
ATURE 11, 23 (2001) (“One direct implication of biology that many economists would accept is
altruism among close relatives.”  In other words, people share with close relatives because it is
in their genetic interest to do so).
98 See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 96, at 124 (“Most giving is, as economists call it,
impure altruism or warm-glow altruism.  You give not only because you want to help but
because it makes you look good, or feel good, or perhaps feel less bad.”).
99 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 14–16 (1953) (arguing that
the truth of a theory is unimportant if the theory accurately predicts reality).
100 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an Inter-
disciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 389, 397 (1997) (“Every model or analysis
of a problem is necessarily an abstraction from reality, ignoring some complication of life to
focus on others.”).
101 See Klock, Contrasting Economic Science, supra note 45, at 198 (“The art of good
model-building lies in the ability to assume well.”).
102 See Klock, Wastefulness, supra note 93, at 240 (“[Selfishness] is merely a simplifying
assumption that produces tractable models with highly accurate predictions in many cases.”).
103 See Tom C. Clark, Internal Operation of the United States Supreme Court, 43 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y 45, 50 (1959) (“After discussion of a case, a vote is taken. . . . [T]he formal
vote begins with the junior Justice and moves up through the ranks of seniority, the Chief
Justice voting last.”).
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and then reach their own decision;104 and just as consumers sort through
all sorts of marketing material before making purchases.105  Indeed,
many would be comforted by the idea that the world really works this
way, with each Justice sincerely applying his best interpretation of the
law to reach a non-political result and then aggregating across the results
using a “majority rules” procedure.106
An interesting paradox results using rational, independent prefer-
ences in a democratic process.107  A Nobel economist, Kenneth Arrow,
mathematically proved that no system of aggregating rational, indepen-
dent preferences, other than a perfect dictatorship, will guarantee that the
aggregated preferences will also be rational.108  The proof of this is
known as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem because it proves the impossi-
bility of constructing a democratic system of voting that will be consist-
ently rational.109  The proof is complex, but a simple example illustrates
the idea.  Rationality requires that if A is preferred to B, and B is pre-
ferred to C, then A must also be preferred to C.110  That is, if a consumer
prefers blue cars over red cars, and red cars over green cars, then the
rational consumer must prefer a blue car over a green car.111  With nine
Justices, however, it is possible to have three prefer blue to red to green,
three prefer red to green to blue, and the final three prefer green to blue
to red.  In such a scenario, if red is selected, two-thirds of the Justices
would prefer blue.  If blue is selected, two-thirds of the Justices would
prefer green.  And if green is selected, two-thirds would prefer red.  This
result can explain apparent instability in many political decisions.
104 Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (“The right of citizens to
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to en-
lightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”).
105 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising as a
Good or Bad, 108 Q. J. ECON. 941, 955 (1993) (providing an example of advertising that
attempts to convince consumers that one brand of chicken is more valuable than another brand
of chicken).
106 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics,
110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1409 (2001) (suggesting that the appearance of partisanship in Supreme
Court decisions makes the Court’s output unsavory).
107 See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 634 (8th ed. 2010) (“[The]
very plausible and desirable features of a social decision mechanism are inconsistent with
democracy . . . .”).
108 See id.
109 See Klock, Bush v. Gore, supra note 21, at 15 (“Professor Arrow’s modern contribu-
tion is formally proving under very general conditions that it is impossible to create any demo-
cratic voting scheme that will result in rational social preferences.”).
110 See VARIAN, supra note 107, at 35–36 (explaining the transitivity axiom of consumer
preferences and why it is reasonable).
111 See id. at 36 (describing the peculiarity resulting from intransitive preferences when
comparing three choices).
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Professor Herbert Hovenkamp criticizes the independent prefer-
ences assumption of Arrow’s Theorem.112  Professor Hovenkamp argues
that people are cooperative and will sacrifice their own weak preferences
in order to yield to the strong preferences of others.113  For example, if I
have a slight preference for vanilla ice cream over chocolate, and my
neighbor has a strong preference for chocolate over vanilla, then when
we get together to freeze some homemade ice cream and only have one
machine between the two of us (such that making both kinds is not an
option), I will agree to chocolate rather than vanilla.  In Hovenkamp’s
model of cooperative voting, aggregated preference orderings are much
less likely to be intransitive than under the independent model because of
cooperation and the willingness to yield when preferences are slight.114
One problem with an application of Hovenkamp’s model to the Su-
preme Court is that many of the divisive, controversial, and important
cases that come before the Court involve issues for which preferences are
exceedingly strong, passionate, and uncompromising.  Consider capital
punishment for murderers, abortion on demand, waterboarding of ter-
rorists, prayer in public schools, and similar issues.  People tend to either
find these positions acceptable or unacceptable, without much room for
compromise.  Many Justices, just like many voters, have strong views on
these issues and the application of the Constitution to these issues.115
These are not cases where it would be reasonable to expect people to
compromise or yield their own judgments.
An alternative to cooperation is vindictiveness.116  A group that
feels passionate about one issue and has relatively weak preferences on
other issues might deliberately vote against others in retaliation if they do
not get the support they want on their major issue.117  This is a well-
known phenomenon in politics.118  Assuming a diversity of preferences
112 See id. at 35 (“[I]f the consumer thinks that X is at least as good as Y and that Y is at
least as good as Z, then the consumer thinks that X is at least as good as Z.”).
113 See Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 952 (questioning the reasonableness of independent
preferences).
114 See id. at 952–53 (providing a hypothetical example of cooperative voting).
115 See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“We as a nation
adopted a written Constitution precisely because it has a fixed meaning that does not
change.”).
116 See Klock, Contrasting Economic Science, supra note 45, at 192–93 (stating that co-
alitions of voters can be vindictive when fighting for their cause).
117 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Friendly Persuasion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at F8
(describing how Lyndon Johnson “took disagreement personally”); David Nakamura, Resigna-
tion’s Reverberations: Thornton’s Move Creates Local, State Intrigue, WASH. POST, Oct. 13,
1999, at M07 (suggesting that, in certain instances, local politicians hold grudges and retaliate
on other issues when given the chance).
118 See Klock, Contrasting Economic Science, supra note 45, at 193 (“Highly charged
issues . . . serve as emotional battlefields where people hold strong and uncompromising be-
liefs, and thus are willing to vote against other groups’ issues in retaliation for those groups’
lack of support for their own.”).
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among individuals, and assuming a diversity of passions among individu-
als, the vindictive model of voting is likely to produce even more intran-
sitive preference orderings than the independent voting model.119
Empirically testing these models of voting is problematic.  If we
make some arbitrary assumptions about the structures of the cooperative
and vindictive models and of the SRCE Justices, we could design a test
statistic that could inform us about whether the data is consistent with the
models or highly unlikely to have been produced by them.120  Without
imposing more structure on the cooperative and vindictive models we
cannot reliably test them.121  Additionally, any structure that might be
assumed is essentially conjured out of thin air.122  Likewise, it is difficult
to develop a definitive test of the independent voting model.  If there is
no correlation between the Justices’ votes, it would be consistent with the
independent voting model.123  However, not surprisingly, the votes are
not uncorrelated.124  Just because the votes are not uncorrelated does not
mean that the Justices do not vote independently, for another variable
could be affecting the voting behavior of the Justices.125  Using only the
voting data, it is not possible to distinguish between the hypothesis that
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas secretly agree to vote as a block 90% of
the time and the hypothesis that some omitted variable, such as conserva-
tive values, drives them towards the same result 90% of the time.126
Nevertheless, just because our models lack detailed structure does
not mean we should abandon them.127  The models still give us some
119 See id. at 192–93 (explaining that voters with lexicographic preferences are not will-
ing to compromise or trade their principles).
120 Cf. Leamer, supra note 62, at 43 (“In order to draw inferences from data as described
by econometric texts, it is necessary to make whimsical assumptions.”).
121 See id. at 36 (“A model with an infinite number of parameters will allow inference
from a finite data set only if there is some prior information that effectively constrains the
ranges of the parameters.”).
122 See id. at 37 (characterizing statistical inferences as opinions due to the whimsical
nature of the assumptions on which they rest).
123 Cf. FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 31 (stating that in general, if two variables
are independent then their correlation is zero).
124 See infra Table 3.
125 See Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 787 (describing evidence that ideology matters
in the Justices’ votes).
126 Cf. Klock, Wastefulness, supra note 93, at 195 n.88 (“A theory is a set of explanations
which can be refuted or supported by facts, but cannot be proven to be true due to the impossi-
bility of ruling out alternative explanations of the same facts.  Logically, one theory cannot
disprove another theory.”).
127 See David F. Hendry, ECONOMETRICS: ALCHEMY OR SCIENCE? ESSAYS IN
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 1 (1993) (“Although important technical difficulties about the
properties of tests and of model selection procedures based on sequential testing await resolu-
tion, model evaluation is a legitimate activity . . . .”).
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insight as to what we should be looking for.128  Additionally, notwith-
standing the gloomy warning about the limits of empirical analysis, we
should not give up on empirics either.129  There is no mathematical tool
that can create information to answer questions in the absence of the
required information,130 but sifting through the data can provide insight
even if it does not provide definitive answers.131  Analysis of the data
can give us quantitative measures of simple attributes that are indisputa-
ble.132  These measures are more persuasive than qualitative state-
ments.133  The empirical analysis of the SRCE data provides simple
quantitative measurements of voting behavior, and applies some complex
modeling that is at least suggestive of underlying relationships in the
data.
Scholars working in the area of empirical legal studies are not the
only researchers facing difficult challenges.134  When modern computing
power became a reality, the field of empirical econometrics expanded.135
There were expectations that one day large statistical models would be
able to accurately predict the future of the economy.136  Certainly there
128 Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 779 (“We do not propose a formal economic
model of judicial behavior, but in the next part we sketch an informal such model to guide our
empirical analysis.”).
129 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1064 (stating that al-
though statistical analysis of data cannot identify the true model, statistics can still be used to
effectively present and communicate information).
130 See Leamer, supra note 62, at 37 (“Because both the sampling distribution and the
prior distribution are actually opinions and not facts, a statistical inference is and must forever
remain an opinion.”).
131 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1060 (“Where no well-
conceived theories exist, the kind of quantitative analysis conducted is a useful exercise to
investigate the stylized facts for use in building theoretical models to be tested with indepen-
dent data.”).
132 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 380 (1991) (analyz-
ing data and finding that “[i]f plaintiffs rather than their attorneys are required to advance trial
costs (including attorneys’ fees), and to bear the risk of failing to recover those costs, the trial
rate will decline and the plaintiffs’ success rate at trial will increase.”).
133 For example, stating that Justice Thomas’ voting record has a correlation with con-
servative dispositions of 0.575 while Justice Kennedy’s voting record has a correlation with
conservative dispositions of 0.265 is more informative than a qualitative statement that Justice
Thomas is substantially more conservative than Justice Kennedy.
134 Cf. Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 17–18 (“In writing this, we do not mean to
suggest that empirical research appearing in law reviews is always, or even usually, worse than
articles in the journals of other scholarly disciplines.”).
135 See Michael C. Lovell, Data Mining, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (1983) (“The effi-
ciency with which data miners go about their work has increased considerably as a result of
technological advance[s].”).
136 See Herman O. Wold, Econometrics as Pioneering in Nonexperimental Model Build-
ing, 37 ECONOMETRICA 369, 369 (1969) (“Econometrics is seen as a vehicle for fundamental
innovations in scientific method, above all in the development of operative forecasting proce-
dures in nonexperimental situations.”).
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was much disappointment when these expectations went unfulfilled.137
Yet even though people have learned that future economic conditions
cannot be consistently predicted accurately, massive resources from both
the public and private sectors continue to be invested into predicting fu-
ture economic conditions.138
Some of the best clues to predict future economic conditions come
from simplistic quantitative measures, such as changes in inventories.139
The field of empirical legal studies can learn lessons from other empiri-
cal subjects.140  One lesson is not to expect too much from the data.141
Another lesson is not to get frustrated and give up.142
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Choice of Sample Period
Selecting the SRCE should be an obvious choice for analysis.  In
order to have any chance of successfully learning about the effects of one
variable on another in a complex system, it is necessary to isolate the
effects of other variables by holding them constant.143  So, if we want to
uncover the effects of Justice Kennedy’s persuasive power on Justice
Thomas, we need to hold the composition of the Court constant.  From
Justice Breyer’s assumption of office on August 3, 1994, until the death
of Justice Rehnquist on September 3, 2005, there was no change in the
composition of the Court.144  This was the second longest time period in
137 See, e.g., Hendry, supra note 60, at 402 (“It is difficult to provide a convincing case
for the defence [sic] against Keynes’ accusation almost 40 years ago that econometrics is
statistical alchemy since many of his criticisms remain apposite.”).
138 See id. at 389 (“Substantial resources have been devoted to empirical
macroeconometric models which comprise hundreds or even thousands of statistically cali-
brated equations, each purporting to represent some autonomous facet of the behaviour [sic] of
economic agents such as consumers and producers, the whole intended to describe accurately
the overall evolution of the economy.”).
139 Cf. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 97TH ANNUAL REPORT
13 (2010) (describing inventory investment).
140 See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 40, at 846 (suggesting that law professors working
on empirical legal scholarship adopt methods used in the literature of social and statistical
sciences).
141 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1009 (“Classical statisti-
cal theory begins with the premise that one knows the true model independent of the data
. . . .”).
142 See Hendry, supra note 60, at 396 (“That the subject is exceedingly complicated does
not entail that it is hopeless.”).
143 See Mark Klock, Dead Hands–Poison Catalyst or Strength-Enhancing Megavitamin?
An Analysis of the Benefits of Managerial Protection and the Detriments of Judicial Interfer-
ence, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 67, 79 (2001) (explaining the role of ceteris paribus in
economic models).
144 Michael Allan Wolf, Supreme Guidance for Wet Growth: Lessons from the High
Court on the Powers and Responsibilities of Local Governments, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 233, 234
(2006).
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history with no change on the Court,145 the longest being the period be-
tween 1812 and 1823.146  Of course the Court took fewer cases in those
days and there were fewer Justices,147 so the SRCE provides the richest
source of voting data holding the composition of the Court constant.  My
sample contains voting data on 920 published opinions by the United
States Supreme Court.
One of the most basic rules of empirical research is that if the re-
searcher wants to infer something about the relationship between X and
Y, all other variables must be held constant, or controlled in a way that
allows the relationship between X and Y to be revealed.148  Suppose that
a farmer observes the following data on crop yield and rainfall for eight
years:149
Yield Total Spring Rainfall









Given this data, the farmer might infer that more rainfall resulted in a
smaller crop yield because a regression of yield on rainfall results in an
estimate that an additional inch of rain lowers yield by 1.67 bushels.150
145 See Nine Justices, Ten Years: A Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 510
& n.1 (2004) (observing that “[a] seven-Justice Court sat together for more than a decade only
once, from Justice Joseph Story’s appointment in 1812 [term starting in 1811] to Justice
Brockholst Livingston’s death in 1823.”).
146 Id. at 510 n.1.
147 See id. (indicating that only seven Justices sat on the Court during Justice Story’s
tenure as Junior Associate Justice).  In the days of the Marshall Court, the Court met only
during February and March because of the light work load.  A Lexis-Nexis search on Court
opinions issued in 1812 identified thirty-two published opinions all dated between February 25
and March 14.
148 See WONNACOTT & WONNACOTT, supra note 63, at 8 (explaining that to study a rela-
tionship between two variables one needs to hold all other variables constant, and where that
cannot be done, one needs to control for the other variables by compensating so as to obtain
the same answer as if the other variables were held constant).
149 This example is taken from id. at 99.
150 Id.
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Now suppose we add an additional variable and reveal that the farmer’s
initial crude analysis forgot to control for temperature:151
Yield Total Spring Rainfall Average Spring









With this additional information we can see that rainfall does increase
crop yield by an average of 5.71 bushels per inch, and that the first
anomalous inference was made because crop yield is also positively af-
fected by temperature, and that the complete data reveals that large
amounts of rainfall occurred in the colder years.152
In addition to controlling for all variables, the model must remain
consistent during the entire period to ensure valid statistical infer-
ences.153  There cannot be any structural change.154  In the farming ex-
ample, if there had been a breakthrough discovery in a revolutionary new
type of fertilizer in the middle of the study period, the inferences drawn
from the data would be flawed.155  A change in the composition of the
Supreme Court is an example of such a structural change.156  The rela-
tionship between Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas could be different
depending on whether Justice Blackmun or Justice Kagan is on the
bench.  If we want to examine that relationship, it is essential to control
for the composition of the remainder of the Court.  Failure to recognize
151 See id.
152 See id. at 99–100.
153 See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 130 (5th ed. 2003) (“In specifying
a regression model, we assume that its assumptions apply to all the observations in our
sample.”).
154 See id. (explaining that if a structural change occurs, the same regression model will
not apply for all observations).
155 Cf. id. (using an example of structural change in the gasoline market stemming from
large oil price shocks).
156 See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 69, 72 (2010) (using statistics to show that a structural shift in the Court occurred
after Franklin Roosevelt’s appointments to the Court).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\22-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 22  1-MAY-13 15:14
558 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22:537
the danger of a structural change in the Court’s composition can lead to
flawed results and thus lead to improper inferences from those results.157
One might argue that a particular Justice will not be influenced by
other Justices on the Court—this is essentially the independent voting
model.158  Such an argument is too simplistic.  Justices only vote on the
cases they select to hear.159  A change in the composition of the Court
could affect the cases the Court selects.160  Thus, even if each Justice
votes independently of the other Justices, a change in the composition of
the Court nevertheless creates an important structural change.161  We are
therefore safest in only drawing inferences based on a stable Court.
Since the SRCE provides us with the largest amount of data on a stable
Court, it is the best place to conduct an empirical analysis of voting.
B. Data Collection
Data was collected for all opinions involving the Supreme Court’s
cases of original jurisdiction, cases brought on appeal, and cases granted
a writ of certiorari.  Opinions regarding denial of certiorari, motions for
reconsideration, applications for stays, applications to vacate stays, etc.
were disregarded.  Cases that were disposed of when the court dismissed
a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted were also disregarded.
For each case I recorded the date, citation, and case number.  The
case number is simply collected as a redundant method of identifying the
opinion in case of an error in recording the citation.  Part of the appeal of
empirical research is the transparency of the data collection and method-
ology, both of which subject the investigator to the scrutiny of other re-
searchers attempting to replicate and confirm or dispute the analysis.162  I
also recorded the vote of each of the nine Justices.  The votes were re-
corded as follows: “1” if the Justice voted with the majority, “0” if the
157 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 781 (analyzing a sample of Supreme
Court Justice voting that includes forty-three different Justices’ votes between 1937 and 2006).
158 Cf. id. at 789 (“Supreme Court Justices do not acknowledge that any of their decisions
are influenced by ideology rather than by neutral legal analysis.”).
159 See David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme
Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the
Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 241 (2009) (“Of the 8,517 petitions filed in
the Court’s 2005–06 Term . . . only 78 were granted argument (0.9%).”).
160 See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Pre-
liminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 60–63 (2006) (documenting a
large shift in the pattern of granting certiorari in the Rehnquist Court before and after the
appointment of Justice Breyer in 1994).
161 See id.  This follows from the fact that a change in the composition of the Court
changes the case selection process, which changes the observation generating process.
162 See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 176–77 (“[D]isclosure norms would make empirical
legal research more amenable to intersubjective review and testing and would go far toward
making this body of research a more objective, respected, and productive form of  scientific
dialogue.”).  Upon request I will provide copies of my data file to other academic researchers.
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Justice dissented, and “-1” if a Justice did not participate.  Of course
there are complications when a Justice concurs in part and dissents in
part.  In such situations I read the opinion and decided whether the vote
should count as a dissent or not.  In most instances such opinions in-
volved a strong support for a different disposition of some aspect of the
case and were treated as dissents, but if the partial dissent involved a
minor procedural matter it was treated as concurring with the majority.
There are also a number of cases (less than one percent) in which a ma-
jority of the Justices dissented in part.  In these cases, I classified the
partial dissents that most closely aligned with the plurality as part of the
majority in order to avoid the anomalous result of having a majority of
Justices dissenting.
In addition to this data, I also collected three more indicator vari-
ables regarding the cases.  One variable indicates whether the case is a
criminal matter or not.  This criminal variable is recorded as a “1” if the
case was criminal in nature and “0” otherwise.  Cases involving deporta-
tion proceedings based on an underlying crime are treated as criminal, as
well as disputes over sentencing, parole, solitary confinement, etc.  An-
other variable indicates whether the Court affirmed the lower court.  This
variable is recorded as a “1” if the lower decision is affirmed and “0”
otherwise.  A “0” does not necessarily mean the Court reversed the lower
court because a decision to vacate and remand would also be recorded as
a “0”.  The more problematic decisions are the ones where the Court
affirms in part and reverses in part.  Again, these decisions require a
close read and evaluation to treat the judgment as affirmed or not.  Nor-
mally, a partial reversal would be recorded as a “0,” meaning not
affirmed.
Finally, the third and most problematic variable indicates whether
the disposition of the case is conservative (recorded as “1”) or not (re-
corded as “0”).  This creates problems on multiple levels.  As a re-
searcher, I try to remain detached from the pros and cons of conservative
and liberal views, yet I must disclose the basis of the methodology for
classifying the dispositions of the cases.163  Although this is likely to
offend some people, perhaps all, I characterize conservatives as cold-
hearted towards the plaintiffs in a wrongful death action and liberals as
loving criminals.  I apologize for these rough and unflattering characteri-
zations and note that many conservative Justices vote for liberal disposi-
tions and many liberal Justices vote for conservative dispositions.164
163 Cf. Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 9 (“An attorney who treats a client like a hypothe-
sis would be disbarred; a Ph.D. who advocates a hypothesis like a client would be ignored.”).
164 Indeed, in my sample the dispositions of the unanimous decisions were coded con-
servative (liberal) at a rate of 59% (41%). See infra Table 1.
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Another problem is that some cases are difficult to classify as con-
servative or liberal.165  Patent disputes are a common example, where
decisions do not appear to correlate with whether a Justice is liberal or
conservative.166  Border disputes or water rights disputes between states
are other examples.167  Nevertheless, a decision needs to be made as to
whether the disposition is more liberal or conservative.  Fortunately,
many of these difficult to classify cases are 9-0 decisions and will not
play much role in analyzing how conservative or liberal outcomes affect
marginal cases.168  Perhaps it should not be surprising that unanimity is
more common in cases that do not have strong political undertones.169
For criminal cases, the determination of whether a disposition is
conservative or liberal is fairly straightforward.  Decisions favoring the
prosecution are conservative, while decisions that favor the defense are
liberal.  There are three types of exceptions to this general rule.  First, if
the crime is merely possession of a handgun and the statute is found to be
unconstitutional, the disposition is coded as conservative because gun
rights are considered a conservative value.170  Second, if the crime in-
volves burning crosses and the conviction is upheld, this is recorded as a
liberal disposition even though it goes against the criminal because I
deem liberal civil rights values to trump other liberal values.171  Third, if
the crime involves securities fraud and the Court reverses the circuit
court’s reversal of a conviction, the decision is recorded as a liberal out-
come since an expansive construction of the federal securities laws is
associated with liberal values.172
165 See Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 777 (noting difficulty in coding decisions as
liberal or conservative).
166 See generally Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. 535 U.S. 826
(2002) (case filed in federal district court resulting in a counter-claim involving patent in-
fringement with an appeal filed in the Federal Circuit).  The Court vacated the circuit court’s
decision and I coded this disposition as conservative because the decision was based on a
determination that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction. See id. at 834.
167 See generally Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000).
168 See, e.g., Holmes, 535 U.S. at 834 (Justices voting unanimously for the disposition,
but with two concurring opinions).
169 Cf. Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court:
An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 409–10 (2002) (showing that unani-
mous decisions are much less likely to be scrutinized by Congress).
170 See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550, 567 (1995) (majority decision by
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas).
171 See e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (affirming the reversal of a defen-
dant’s conviction for cross-burning).
172 See e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding a defendant crimi-
nally liable for insider trading). See generally Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Partici-
pation in a Deceptive Scheme to Defraud Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)?
The Disastrous Result and Reasoning of Stoneridge, 58 KAN. L. REV. 309 (2010) (providing a
discussion suggesting that conservative Justices favor a narrow construction of the securities
laws and liberal Justices favor a broad remedial interpretation).
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The rules for classifying the disposition of non-criminal cases are
more complex and sometimes more discretion is required because the
cases can have multiple dimensions.  Dispositions broadening free
speech rights are liberal, and those restricting speech are marked as con-
servative.  Dispositions favoring employees, unions, the disabled, Native
American Indian tribes, class-action plaintiffs, and debtors are marked as
liberal.  Dispositions favoring employers, businesses, mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements, private property rights, and creditors are marked as con-
servative.  Dispositions that are reached not on the merits but by
arguments involving lack of standing or lack of jurisdiction tend to be
recorded as conservative outcomes, whereas dispositions that involve an
expansive interpretation of federal jurisdiction tend to be recorded as lib-
eral outcomes.
C. Remarks about Statistical Methodology
The difficulty of classifying dispositions is a good example of the
limitations of empirical work.173  Empirical work usually entails a
model, but models are necessarily abstractions of reality.174  Good mod-
els simplify reality in a way that allows us to better understand relation-
ships of interest.175  Consider the economist’s model of demand as one
example.  Demand for a good is inversely related to the price of the
good.176  Since the price of a good is what one has to give up to obtain it,
the less one has to sacrifice to get the good, the more desirable the good
will be, and the more it will be demanded.177  The result is not an as-
173 See Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 85–86 (discussing the difficulty of classifying
case dispositions).
174 Consider the following excerpt from a popular text:
Because all models simplify reality by stripping part of it away, they are abstrac-
tions.  Critics of economics often point to abstraction as a weakness.  Most econo-
mists, however, see abstraction as a real strength.
. . . .
Like maps, economic models are abstractions that strip away detail to expose
only those aspects of behavior that are important to the question being asked. . . .
But be careful.  Although abstraction is a powerful tool for exposing and ana-
lyzing specific aspects of behavior, it is possible to oversimplify. . . .
The key here is that the appropriate amount of simplification and abstraction
depends upon the use to which the model will be put.  To return to the map example:
You don’t want to walk around San Francisco with a map made for drivers—there
are too many very steep hills!
KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 10–11 (5th ed. 1999).
175 See id.
176 See Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317,
320 (2002) (“As a general rule, as the price of an item falls, the amount that people are willing
to buy and consume—that is, the quantity demanded—increases.”).
177 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 25 (“This result is the famous law of
demand.”).
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sumption itself but is a derivation from a few simple axioms.178  The
three axioms are the following: consumers have a complete set of prefer-
ence orderings; the preference orderings are transitive; and more is pre-
ferred to less.179  There could be exceptions that probe the rule, but these
axioms have held up remarkably well in experiments involving normal
people, cognitively impaired people, and laboratory rats and pigeons.180
The model of demand helps us to better understand the role that
price plays in affecting purchases of a good, but it abstracts from reality
because it ignores (or assumes constant values for) all other important
variables, such as income, prices of other goods, tastes, fashion, etc.181
A change in any of these other variables will change the relationship
between demand and price.182  Since these variables change constantly,
the relationship between demand and price is not stable, but the model
still shows that price is an important determinant which affects the quan-
tity demanded in a negative way.183  While holding everything else con-
stant, as the price of a good rises, people tend to substitute different
goods into their consumption bundles.184  Some goods are more easily
substituted than others.185  Rising beef prices will lead to more consump-
tion of poultry, pork, fish, and pasta.186  On the other hand, rising gaso-
line prices will less likely lead people to purchase bicycles.187  Goods
178 See id. at 24 (“We may use the model of consumer choice of the previous sections to
derive a relationship between the price of a good and the amount of that good in a consumer’s
optimal bundle.”).
179 See VARIAN, supra note 107, at 35 (providing the axioms of consumer theory).
180 See JOHN H. KAGEL ET AL., ECONOMIC CHOICE THEORY: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 2 (1995)  (“[T]he fact that, when put to the test, rats and pigeons con-
form to elementary principles of economic theory provides rather striking support for the the-
ory and, indirectly, refutes the argument that the theory cannot be extended to nonmarket
behavior . . . .”). See also LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 96, at 212–13 (describing how one
economist taught capuchin monkeys to use money and found that these monkeys also obeyed
the most basic law of economics).
181 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 25 (stating that derivation of the demand
relationship requires that all other variables be held constant).
182 See VARIAN, supra note 107, at 95–96 (stating that economists study how demand
changes in response to changes in the economic environment).
183 Cf. GREENE, supra note 153, at 130 (using data from the U.S. gasoline market as an
example of instability in a market with changing conditions).
184 See VARIAN, supra note 107, at 112 (“The idea is that . . . the consumer substitutes
away from the more expensive good to the less expensive good.”).
185 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 25–26 (“Generalizing, the most important
determinant of the price elasticity of demand for a good is the availability of substitutes.”).
186 Cf. id. at 26 (“Substitution is easier for narrowly defined goods and harder for broad
categories.  If the price of cucumbers goes up, switching to peas or carrots is easy . . . .”).
187 Cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 79 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining
that when gasoline price shocks occur, individuals gradually respond by replacing their vehi-
cles with more fuel efficient alternatives).
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like beef have elastic demand, high response to small changes; and goods
like gasoline have inelastic demand, low response to large changes.188
A more concrete example of abstraction would be a road map.  A
road map simplifies the relationship between two places.189  It leaves out
mountains, traffic lights, and buildings,190 but it is useful to a person
travelling by automobile because it allows her to see the relative posi-
tions in two dimensions as well as the available routes.191  Depending on
the circumstances, however, a road map might not be useful to a person
travelling by bicycle, foot, or boat.192
A familiar yet intangible example of abstraction would be the scales
of justice.193  The scales of justice weigh all the evidence on both sides
of a case.194  This is an abstraction since we do not literally decide cases
by measuring the physical weight of evidence.195  Obviously oral testi-
mony and eyewitness evidence cannot be weighed.  Nevertheless, the
model is widely taught and used to describe the relationship between
evidence and outcomes.196
The point of this discussion about models is to illustrate how the
quality of empirical work is limited by the quality of the models.  Where
we have a strong model we can impose a great deal of structure on our
empirical work and obtain fairly precise conclusions.197  For example,
under the model of gravity, Earth’s gravitational pull accelerates an ob-
188 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 26 (explaining that goods with many possible
substitutes will have more elasticity than goods with few substitutes).
189 See CASE & FAIR, supra note 174, at 10 (stating that simplifying the world as flat on a
map is useful).
190 Id. at 11.
191 Id.
192 See Klock, Wastefulness, supra note 93, at 190 (“A road map will not be very useful
to someone traveling on foot in the wilderness or aiming an intercontinental ballistic
missile.”).
193 See id. at 192 (discussing nonexistent things with useful applications in reality, such as
Euclidean lines, imaginary numbers, and the scales of justice).
194 See Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
83, 117 (2010) (“Presented with two opposing sides to a dispute, the judge or jury weighs
conflicting evidence to decide which side should prevail”).
195 See Klock, Wastefulness, supra note 93, at 192 n.70 (“The phrase ‘weight of the evi-
dence’ obviously refers to the relative importance assigned to evidence by the arbiter.”).
196 See id. at 192 (“In fact the scales of justice are a model that attempts to quantify a
complex function depending on qualitative arguments.”).
197 See GREENE, supra note 153, at 3 (“With a sufficiently detailed stochastic structure
and adequate data, the analysis will become a matter of deducing the properties of a
probability distribution.”).  Professor Greene further writes:
The process of econometric analysis departs from the specification of a theoretical
relationship.  We initially proceed on the optimistic assumption that we can obtain
precise measurements on all the variables in a correctly specified model.  If the ideal
conditions are met at every step, the subsequent analysis will probably be routine.
Unfortunately, they rarely are.
Id.
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ject in a vacuum at sea level at a rate of 9.8 meters per second per sec-
ond.198  Where we have a weak model, however, we are unable to
impose much structure on our analysis.199  This does not mean that we
should abandon empirical work.200  We can still learn something from
cataloging, measuring, and summarizing empirical data.201  Our models
of independent, cooperative, and vindictive voting are not as strong as
the model of gravity, but they can still provide guidance for empirical
work.202
Empirical work also involves measurement, which itself can involve
abstraction.203  When we attempt to summarize a multi-dimensional con-
cept into a single number, we abstract away from the underlying reality
and distort the information by compressing it into a single unit of mea-
surement.204  The example given by Epstein and King measures George
W. Bush as five feet and ten inches tall.205  If George W. Bush’s height
is the only measurement, it ignores a great deal of other information
about the man.206  Similarly, observing that Justice O’Connor tended to
be conservative ignores more detailed information about the issues for
which she was more conservative and the issues for which she was less
conservative.207
Although my construction of the conservative outcome variable vio-
lates one of the rules of good empirical research espoused by Epstein and
King, I can defend it.  Epstein and King suggest that human judgment
should be avoided.208  I could have reduced some of the statistical noise
198 See GERALD HOLTON & STEPHEN G. BRUSH, PHYSICS, THE HUMAN ADVENTURE:
FROM COPERNICUS TO EINSTEIN AND BEYOND 113 (3rd ed. 2001).
199 See GREENE, supra note 153, at 4 (“The theory may make only a rough guess as to the
correct functional form, if it makes any at all, and we may be forced to choose from an embar-
rassingly long menu of possibilities.”).
200 See Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 17–18 (concluding that the state of empirical
legal scholarship is poor but that it can be improved with more attention to methodological
details and rules of inference).
201 See id. at 54 (“[U]sing insights from data is a good way to develop theory . . . .”).
202 See Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 779–80 (suggesting that an informal model
can guide empirical analysis).
203 See Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 81 (“The key is that we abstract the right dimen-
sions for our purposes, and that we measure enough dimensions of each subject to capture all
the parts that are essential to our research question.”).
204 See id. (“[M]easurement allows us to put many apparently disparate events or subjects
on the same dimension . . . .”).
205 Id.
206 See id. (“[E]verything about the object of study is lost except the dimension or dimen-
sions being measured.”).
207 See Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 782 (providing a table of summary statistics
showing Justice O’Connor to be conservative overall, but more conservative in civil liberty
cases than in economic regulation cases).
208 See Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 103 (“A study that gives insufficient information
about the process by which the data come [sic] to be observed by the investigator cannot be
replicated and thus stands in violation of the rule we articulated [earlier].”).
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in the measure of conservative disposition by eliminating cases for which
the classification as conservative was difficult and instead focusing on
the easy cases.  Indeed I do this in the analytical section by looking at
some of the results using the subset of criminal cases for which the defi-
nition of conservative and liberal are more straightforward.  Neverthe-
less, making a decision as to which cases are too close to call would still
involve human judgment.  However, human judgment is less important
in this particular study.  The reason that Epstein and King suggest that
judgment should be avoided is because it makes it impossible for other
researchers scrutinizing the analysis to replicate the data.209  There are
two reasons for replicating the analysis.  One is to extend the analysis to
a different time period.  That is irrelevant because this study focuses only
on a period of time during which all the Justices on the Court were con-
stant.  There can be no extension to other time periods because no other
time period had all nine of these Justices on the Court.  The other poten-
tial reason to replicate the data is to scrutinize or verify the exact same
study.210  That is also irrelevant in this analysis because I will freely give
the data in an Excel spreadsheet to any researcher that requests it.  Such
researchers are then free to use the data as is, or to take issue with my




We begin the presentation of the empirical results by reporting some
overall measures for the Court: the proportion of cases that were crimi-
nal, the proportion that were affirmed, the proportion that had a con-
servative disposition, the proportion that involved unanimity, and the
proportion that had 5–4 split decisions.  These results are summarized in
Table 1 and show the proportions to be 34%, 29%, 59%, 44%, and 21%,
respectively.  Given the composition of the Court, the figure of 59% con-
servative dispositions seems very reasonable.  The fact that only 29% of
the cases are affirmed suggests that this Court was inclined to review
209 See id. at 38 (“Good empirical work adheres to the replication standard: another re-
searcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and reproduce the research without
any additional information from the author.”).
210 See id. at 42.  The authors write:
[T]he point of the replication standard is to ensure that a published work stands alone
so that readers can consume what it has to offer without any necessary connection
with, further information from, or beliefs about the status or reputation of the author.
The replication standard keeps empirical inquiry above the level of ad hominem
attacks on unquestioning acceptance of arguments by authority figures.
Id.
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cases they were more likely to reverse or vacate.211  The proportion of
5–4 decisions is quite large, but it is not even half the proportion of
unanimous decisions.212  This suggests that the Rehnquist Court was not
as divided as portrayed by the media and commentators.213  This is also
not surprising because it is known that commentators and reporters tend
to focus on controversy.214  Writing about controversial decisions is
more interesting and more likely to result in successful publication than
writing about non-controversial decisions.215  It is useful to know exactly
what proportion of cases was unanimous in a stable Supreme Court in
order to understand how the selective media publishing biases affect our
perceptions of division within the Court.
211 Professors Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal conduct an interesting empirical analysis
of individual Justices’ votes to affirm and find similar proportions to the aggregate results. See
generally Lee Epstein et al., Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal Judicial Experience
Biases the Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2009).  These authors argue that
Under most theories of judging on the Supreme Court, “reversal” is the more plausi-
ble forecast.  Scholars who study the hierarchy of justice, for example, have noted
that the threat of reversal is the only sanction available to Supreme Court Justices
against errant circuit courts.  Were the Justices to affirm all their decisions, the threat
would lose its credibility.
Id. at 871–72.
212 In a study covering 1937–2004, Professor Landes and Judge Posner found the propor-
tion of decisions decided by a single vote to be 15.2% and the proportion of unanimous deci-
sions to be 30%.  Landes and Posner, supra note 46, at 790, 800.  So the SRCE does have a
higher proportion of single vote majority decisions, but also has a substantially larger increase
in the proportion of unanimous decisions.  It should be noted that Landes and Posner defined
unanimity as 9-0 decisions, whereas I defined unanimity to be zero dissents, but since the
number of cases with abstaining Justices is small and the number of those which were unani-
mous is smaller, there will not be much difference attributable to that.
213 See generally Catherine Crier, Journalism and the Law, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 387
(2006) (describing biases in reporting on the Supreme Court).  The attorney-reporter wrote:
The news media would better serve its readers if journalists acknowledged that the
decisions issued by courts at all levels do not necessarily break down along the
narrative lines that serve as a template for political stories.
Ironically, even when horse race reporting is somewhat appropriate, members
of the media still do the audience a disservice.  In their coverage of Congress, state
legislatures, and administrative agencies—the very institutions that create the laws
and rules at the core of most legal disputes—journalists often fail to explain the real
issues.
Id. at 395.
214 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1041 (“Newspapers print
interesting stories, not dull ones.  Editors do not devote scarce space to articles which have
uninteresting results.”) (footnote omitted).
215 See id. (“Of all the papers written, only the best, most interesting, most provocative,
and most surprising will be selected for publication.”).
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TABLE 1: ATTRIBUTES OF OPINIONS IN THE DATA
Attribute Percent
Criminal Cases 34%




One or More Justices Abstained 4.7%
More than One Justice Abstained 0.1%
Other researchers developing metrics on how liberal or conservative
certain Justices are have thrown out the unanimous decisions from their
analysis.216  The argument is that unanimous decisions do not inform us
very well about Justices’ leanings.217  Notwithstanding this argument,
there is still value in knowing how many decisions are unanimous, and
other researchers have published papers that do not provide any informa-
tion on this proportion.218
Table 2 presents statistics for individual Justices.  The Justices are
listed in order of seniority.  This table displays the participation rate (the
percentage of the 920 cases the Justice participated in); the batting aver-
age (the number of times the Justice voted with the majority or con-
curred, divided by the number of cases the Justice participated in); a
measure of contrariness (the proportion of the Court’s decisions with a
sole dissenter accounted for by that Justice); and the correlation of each
Justice’s voting record with the conservative variable.  For the construc-
tion of the correlation measure, unanimous cases were omitted.
Six of the Justices missed participating in four or fewer of the 920
cases.  Justice Kennedy participated in every one,219  and Justice Gins-
burg only missed a single case.220  Three of the Justices (Rehnquist,
O’Connor, and Breyer) missed ten to twelve of the cases.  It should be
noted though that Justice Rehnquist only missed one case during the first
216 Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 137 n.3
(2002) (“We exclude unanimous cases because they contribute no information to the likeli-
hood.  Including unanimous cases also makes it quite difficult to specify reasonable prior dis-
tributions for the case parameters . . . .”).
217 See id.
218 See, e.g., Ho & Quinn, supra note 156, at 72–76 (using newly collected data on all
non-unanimous cases to analyze ideological voting shifts without disclosing any information
about the relative frequency of unanimous decisions).
219 See infra Table 2 (showing 100% participation rate).
220 The case is FEC v. NRA, 513 U.S. 88 (1994).
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nine years of this data.221  His relatively large number of absences during
the last two years was most likely a result of his health and treatment.222
TABLE 2: METRICS OF JUSTICES
Participation Batting Contrarian Correlation w/
Justice Rate Average Percent Conservative
Rehnquist 98.70% .849 3.75% .554
Stevens 99.57% .724 58.75% -.643
O’Connor 98.80% .891 1.25% .285
Scalia 99.67% .792 10.00% .540
Kennedy 100% .908 3.75% .265
Souter 99.67% .823 5.00% -.428
Thomas 99.78% .798 11.25% .575
Ginsburg 99.89% .798 3.75% -.431
Breyer 98.91% .808 2.50% -.341
It will not be surprising that the highest batting averages belong to
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, respectively, due to their reputation as
swing votes in close decisions.223  Justice Rehnquist is next, then Justice
Souter, followed by Justice Breyer.  Justices Ginsburg and Thomas are
tied, with Justices Scalia and Stevens having the lowest batting averages.
The standout metric is Justice Stevens’ contrariness.  Justice Stevens ac-
counted for nearly 59% of the Court’s cases with a single dissent.  The
second most contrary Justice is Justice Thomas, who accounted for
l1.25% of solo dissents, less than one fifth the amount of Justice Stevens.
At the low end, Justice O’Connor had just a single solo dissent224 ac-
counting for 1.25% of the total of eighty solo dissents in the data.
The metric of conservative values—the correlation of voting with
conservative dispositions in non-unanimous decisions—ranks the Jus-
tices in order from most conservative to least as: Thomas, Rehnquist,
Scalia, O’Connor, Kennedy, Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens.
This ordering is nearly the same as that produced by Landes and Posner,
221 The case is Vey v. Clinton, 520 U.S. 937 (1997).  This was actually a motion to bring
a case against President Clinton without an attorney, and was denied with one Justice
dissenting.
222 Cf. Our Turn: The Case for Limiting Tenure on High Court, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, July 31, 2005, at 2H (“Health problems prevented Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
now 80 years old with 33 years on the high court, from being present for oral arguments during
the recently completed session.”).
223 See Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court,
83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2005) (identifying Justice O’Connor as a median Justice); Landes
& Posner, supra note 46, at 802 (identifying Justice Kennedy as a median Justice).
224 The case is Lebron v. Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
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except that Breyer and Souter are reversed and Ginsburg and Stevens are
reversed.225  The magnitude of the differences in the measurements for
Breyer and Souter is trivial, but the magnitude is slightly more noticeable
for Ginsburg and Stevens.
Due to the subjectivity involved in classifying case dispositions as
conservative, the correlations of the Justices’ votes with conservative
outcomes is replicated with the subset of criminal cases which are classi-
fied by a tighter set of rules.  This serves as a check on the robustness of
the rank ordering of the conservativeness of the justices.  These results
are reported in Table 3 which lists the Justices in order from most con-
servative to least conservative based on the rankings obtained from Table
2.  For comparison and reader convenience, Table 3 also provides the
Landes-Posner (L-P) metric of conservative voting.  It should be noted
that L-P measures the proportion of conservative votes in non-unanimous
cases that are bounded by zero and one, with a value of 0.5 representing
neutrality.226  The correlations are bounded by negative one and positive
one, with a value of zero representing neutrality.  Table 3 clearly shows
that restricting the analysis to the subset of criminal cases does not
change the ranking order of any of the Justices from that found in Table
2.  This provides some indication of robustness in the classification of
dispositions as conservative.
This is an opportunity to expose another flaw in prior literature on
Supreme Court voting.  Numerous researchers have calculated metrics
for ordering Justices from more conservative to more liberal.227  For ex-
ample, Landes and Posner constructed a measure of percentage of votes
which were conservative for forty-three Supreme Court Justices’ voting
records between 1937 and 2006, and then ordered the Justices.228  There
are some obvious qualifications on the rankings that Landes and Posner
fairly observe.229  For example, what it means to be conservative has
changed over time, and so it is difficult to compare Justices that served
seventy years apart.230  What is absent from their analysis, however, is
any discussion of measurement error and confidence intervals.231  For
example, ranking Justice Thomas as more conservative than Justice
Rehnquist because Thomas’ score of 0.822 is greater than Rehnquist’s
225 Landes & Posner, supra note 46, Table 3 at 782–83.
226 See id.
227 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 815–16 (1995) (providing a table with ideological
scores for Supreme Court Justices).
228 Landes & Posner, supra note 46, Table 3 at 782–83.
229 See id. at 781 (“[S]ome of the specific rankings cannot be taken seriously.”).
230 See id.
231 See id. at 782–83 (giving point estimates of conservatism without confidence intervals
or comparable information). See also Segal et al., supra note 227, at 816 (giving point esti-
mates of ideological values without confidence intervals or comparable information).
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score of 0.815, without providing information or even a discussion about
the margin of error, is misleading.232
There is a philosophical issue here regarding whether we treat the
record of Supreme Court votes as the complete population of votes or as
an observed sample (a subset of all cases that could have been voted
on).233  Arguably, the population of Justices’ votes consists of all cases
that the Court could possibly vote on, and those it did vote on are just a
sample drawn from the population of possible cases.234  In this frame-
work, the metrics calculated by Landes and Posner must be considered
estimates, rather than parameters.235  Parameters are descriptive mea-
sures of a population, whereas statistics are descriptive measures of a
sample that have known and desirable properties (in the case of good
statistics) relative to the underlying parameters.236  Estimates involve es-
timation error and therefore have margins of error of given size with
certain probabilities.237  To properly infer that Thomas is more conserva-
tive than Rehnquist, we need to know that a difference of 0.007 in their
conservative scores is statistically significant.238
Statistical significance is a widely used term that is not well under-
stood in the community of legal scholars.239  Essentially, for estimates to
be statistically significantly different, the discrepancies between them
must be large enough to be discernible from what might reasonably oc-
232 Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 782 (ranking Justice Thomas with a score of .822
and Justice Rehnquist with a score of .815).
233 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1015 (explaining the
difference between a population and a sample).
234 See Thompson & Wachtell, supra note 159, at 240–41 (describing the small propor-
tion of cases filed with the Supreme Court that are actually granted a hearing).
235 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that attributes of a sample
can be useful estimators of population attributes).
236 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1016–17 (discussing
poor statistics, accurate statistics, and desirable properties of statistics).
237 Cf. FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 256 (“The statistician’s reason for prefer-
ring a random sample . . . is to be able to make probabilistic statements . . . .”).
238 Cf. Epstein & King, supra note 2, at 98 (complaining that quantitative legal research
scholars do not document the procedures they use to obtain their estimates with enough infor-
mation for the readers to assess the precision of the estimates).
239 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1008 (“[C]ommentators
and reporters frequently give too much weight to statistics and treat them as actual facts rather
than mere estimates which might not be valid or reliable for inferential reasoning.”).  Finkel-
stein and Levin make the following complaint:
Frequently, statistical presentations in litigation are made not by statisticians but by
experts from other disciplines, by lawyers who know a little, or by the court itself.
This free-wheeling approach distinguishes statistical learning from most other exper-
tise received by the courts and undoubtedly has increased the incidence of models
with inappropriate assumptions, or just plain statistical error.
FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at x.  As one example, they give a detailed exposition of
numerous flaws in a statistical study embraced by the Supreme Court to conclude that six
person juries are as reliable as twelve person juries. See id. at 109–10.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\22-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 35  1-MAY-13 15:14
2013] COOPERATION AND DIVISION 571
cur by chance.240  How large is large enough depends on three factors:
the sample size, the true variation in the population for the underlying
variable of interest, and the chosen level of significance.241  The chosen
level of significance refers to the percentage of occurrences considered
reasonable to make a Type I mistake—rejecting a correct hypothesis.242
In order to explain these concepts, I will illustrate with an example.
Suppose that there are two candidates for office, A and B.  Let us
assume for purposes of simplified calculations that in the population of
voters who actually vote on election day, each candidate gets exactly
fifty percent of the vote.  If in fact we knew this information, there would
be no point in conducting a pre-election poll, but we are putting our-
selves in the position of Greek gods residing on Mt. Olympus, with a
perspective that enables us to see everything.243  We then ask what infer-
ences could the mere mortals below make when estimating the propor-
tion of votes that candidate A will receive from a random sample?
Suppose a pollster randomly selected two people.  If each person
has a fifty percent chance of supporting candidate A, there are three pos-
sible results: both people would support candidate A with a probability
of 25%, both people would support candidate B with a probability of
25%, and one would support each 50% of the time.  With a sample of
two, we would correctly estimate the true proportion of votes 50% of the
time.  This is not acceptable.  Suppose we increase the sample size to
four.  Now the chances of finding 100% support for either A or B goes
from one in two to one in eight.  We are much more likely to obtain an
estimated value close to 0.5.244  In fact, the size of our margin of error is
inversely proportional to the square root of the sample size.245  For ex-
ample, a poll with a sample of ten thousand voters will have a margin of
error equal to one-tenth of the margin of error for a poll with a sample of
one hundred voters.246
Statisticians have a powerful tool called the Central Limit Theorem
which tells them that a linear combination of a large number of random
240 See DAVID R. ANDERSON ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECO-
NOMICS 226 (abbreviated 4th ed. 2007) (explaining that statistical significance at the a´ level
means that the discrepancy is large enough that if in fact the true difference were zero, a
discrepancy of that magnitude would only occur with a probability of a´) [hereinafter ANDER-
SON ET AL., ESSENTIALS].
241 See id. at 237 (giving the formula for the size of confidence interval, which just de-
pends on three variables: significance level, variability of the population, and sample size).
242 See id. at 225–26 (explaining the meaning of Type I error and significance level).
243 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1024 n.116 (explaining
the origin of the term “Olympian knowledge”).
244 See id. at 1018 (“The probability of getting an estimate of a given size error ap-
proaches zero as the sample size increases . . . .”).
245 See ANDERSON ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 240, at 237 (showing that the size of
the margin of error is proportional to 1/vn where n is the sample size).
246 1/10,0000.5=0.1/1000.5=0.01.
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variables will have a very specific probability distribution known as the
normal distribution.247  This enables the statistician to know exactly what
the probabilities are for an estimated proportion from a sample of a given
size differing from the true proportion by a given amount.248  In our ex-
ample where 50% of voters will vote for candidate A, approximately
95% of all randomly chosen samples of four hundred voters would result
in an estimated support level between 45% and 55%.249  Thus, if we
estimated candidate A’s support at 48%, we would not consider that sig-
nificantly different from 50% because a true support level of 50% would
generate estimates between 45% and 55% ninety-five percent of the
time.  If we conducted this poll and got an estimated support level of
44%, however, we know that this large of a deviation from 50% would
happen by random chance less than one in twenty times and we might
consider that sufficiently small odds to conclude that the support is not at
the 50% level.250
It is not too surprising that discussion of confidence intervals can be
left out of research on voting records since the information required to
makes such assessments is normally omitted from polling results.251  For
example, it is common to report that a poll has a margin of error of three
percent, or that a poll has a margin of error of four percent.252  Such
reporting is incomplete without also providing the level of significance
associated with the margin of error.253  Any given poll can correctly be
said to have any arbitrarily chosen margin of error by varying the level of
significance associated with the margin of error.254
Hypothesis testing in statistics involves specifying a hypothesis, cal-
culating a test statistic from a random sample of data, and then either
247 See GREENE, supra note 153, at 910 (“[T]he theorem states that sums of random vari-
ables, regardless of their form, will tend to be normally distributed. . . . It requires, essentially,
only that the mean be a mixture of many random variables, none of which is large compared
with their sum.”).
248 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 113 (explaining how the probabilities of
deviant values are calculated using the normal distribution).
249 See id. at 171 (giving the formula for the confidence interval as p ± 1.96(p(1-p)/n)0.5
which in the example is .5 ± 1.96×(.5×.5/400)0.5.
250 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1019 (describing the
process of rejecting a hypothesis with 95% confidence).
251 See id. at 1021 n.106 (stating that it is common practice to report poll results without
reporting the associated level of confidence).
252 See id. (“It is common practice to report that a poll has a margin of error of plus or
minus 3% . . . .”).
253 See id. at 1021 (“[S]tatements about a poll’s margin of error without reporting the
chosen significance level are uninformative or meaningless.”).
254 See id. at 1021 n.106 (“Since the margin of error can always be decreased (or in-
creased) by increasing (or decreasing) the significance level, we have no way of knowing how
reliable or accurate the poll really is unless the significance level is also disclosed with the
margin of error.”)
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accepting or rejecting the hypothesis.255  There are four possible out-
comes in hypothesis testing: correctly accepting a true null hypothesis,256
correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis, incorrectly rejecting a true null
hypothesis, and incorrectly accepting a false null hypothesis.257  The first
of the two incorrect possibilities is called a Type I error and the second a
Type II error.258  Given that we presume criminal defendants are inno-
cent, we can think of convicting an innocent man as a Type I error and
acquitting a guilty man as a Type II error.259  Note that the probabilities
of Type I and Type II errors are not independent of each other.260  If I
always reject the null hypothesis I can never make a Type II error, and if
I always accept the null hypothesis I can never make a Type I error.261
So the smaller I set the probability of a Type I error, the larger will be the
probability of committing a Type II error.262  Statisticians typically set
the probability of a Type I error at either 10%, 5%, or 1%.263  This is
what they refer to as the level of significance.264  At a 5% level of signif-
icance, my test statistic will incorrectly reject a true null hypothesis 5%
of the time, if the sampling is done correctly.265
The relationship between the margin of error and the significance
level is such that a larger level of significance (10% being larger than
5%, being larger than 1%), the smaller the margin of error.266  In other
words, if I am comfortable making more Type I errors, I do not need to
see as large of a difference between the statistical estimate and the hy-
pothesized value to conclude they are different.267  To be more concrete,
255 See DAVID R. ANDERSON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 314–15
(6th ed. 1996).
256 The null hypothesis is the hypothesis that is being formally tested.  We assume it is
true and then determine whether the observed data are unlikely to have been generated under
that assumption.  If so, we reject the null hypothesis; otherwise we accept it. See ANDERSON
ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 240, at 223 (explaining how to construct and test a null
hypothesis).
257 See id. at 225.
258 Id.
259 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978).
260 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1020 (“[W]e can exert
some control over the error rates, though we cannot independently control each error rate.”).
261 See id. at 1020.
262 See id. at 1020–21 (“There is a trade-off in that a lower incidence of one type of error
translates into a higher incidence for the other type.”).
263 See ANDERSON ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 240, at 200 (showing the three most
commonly used significance levels to be 10%, 5%, and 1%).
264 Id.
265 See id.
266 See PAUL NEWBOLD ET AL., STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 268–69 (5th
ed. 2003) (“[I]f the confidence level (1-a) is decreased, the margin of error will be reduced.
For example, a 95% confidence interval will be shorter than a 99% confidence interval based
on the same information.”).
267 See id. at 269 (cautioning that reducing the size of the margin of error increases the
probability that the true value lies outside the interval estimate).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\22-3\CJP301.txt unknown Seq: 38  1-MAY-13 15:14
574 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22:537
a given poll that asserts a margin of error of plus or minus 4% at a
significance level of 5% could be correctly reported as having a margin
of error of plus or minus 5.2% at a significance level of 1%, and as
having a margin of error of plus or minus 3.36% at a significance level of
10%.268  This is why reporting a margin of error without reporting the
significance level is a bad practice—it does not provide all of the infor-
mation required to ascertain the true accuracy of the poll.269
In the context of the current data set, I suggest that the batting aver-
age for each Justice can be viewed as an estimate of their true propensity
to vote with the majority.  The estimate based on the observed cases is
noisy because the sample is finite, and some of the differences across
Justices should be considered too small to be statistically significant.270
We would like to have some idea as to how large the differences need to
be in order to be considered statistically different.  One way to do this is
to test the hypothesis of no difference for each Justice; however, there is
a statistical problem with that approach.  Standard hypothesis testing pro-
cedures assume that the observations are independent, meaning, for ex-
ample, that Justice Scalia’s votes do not affect the probabilities of Justice
Thomas’ votes.271  So instead of calculating test statistics, I construct
confidence intervals.  This approach assumes that the cases are randomly
selected, but not that the votes across Justices are independent.272
Table 3 displays the lower limit and the upper limit of the ninety-
five percent confidence intervals for each Justice’s batting average.  See-
ing how wide these intervals are conveys a sense of the precision, or
imprecision, of the point estimates for the batting averages.  Further-
more, the degree to which the confidence intervals overlap or remain
distinctive conveys a sense of how different or similar the Justices’ bat-
ting averages are.  The dissemination of this type of information is ex-
tremely valuable in empirical research, and it is frequently missing in the
empirical legal scholarship, which often just displays an ordering with
268 This follows from the fact that the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance intervals are propor-
tionate to 1.645s/√n, 1.96s/√n, 2.576s/√n, respectively. See ANDERSON ET AL., ESSENTIALS,
supra note 240, at 200 (providing a table that shows the factors of proportionality for each
confidence and significance level).
269 See Klock, Finding Random Coincidences, supra note 10, at 1021 n.106.
270 For example, Justice Breyer’s estimated propensity to vote with the majority of 0.808
is larger than Justice Ginsburg’s estimated propensity of 0.798, but the estimates are not statis-
tically discernible for us to conclude that Justice Ginsburg is truly less likely to vote with the
majority than Justice Breyer.
271 Cf. NEWBOLD ET AL., supra note 266, at 346 (giving the procedure for testing differ-
ences between two proportions using independent random samples).
272 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 114 (informing the reader that as long as
the observations are independent, the estimated average will have a normal probability
distribution).
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point estimates without any information as to the accuracy or variability
of the point estimates.273
TABLE 3: CORRELATION FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF 5-4 DECISIONS
Criminal Landes-Posner
Justice Full Sample Subsample Metric
Thomas .575 .660 .822
Rehnquist .554 .653 .815
Scalia .540 .559 .757
O’Connor .285 .325 .680
Kennedy .265 .250 .647
Breyer -.341 -.351 .372
Souter -.428 -.459 .374
Ginsburg -.431 -.467 .312
Stevens -.643 -.720 .341
In Table 4, we can see that the top four batting averages all overlap
to a point.  Justice Souter, with the fourth highest estimated batting aver-
age, has an upper limit on his confidence interval equal to the lower limit
of Justice Kennedy’s confidence interval.  We also see that the six lowest
batting average confidence intervals involve overlap.  From this we can
conclude that most of the differences across Justices on this measure are
not statistically significant.  However, a few are.  Justice Stevens’ aver-
age is clearly discernible in statistical terms from Justices Kennedy’s,
O’Connor’s, and Rehnquist’s.  Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg are
clearly different from Justices Kennedy and O’Connor.  Finally, Justice
Breyer’s batting average is clearly discernible from Justice Kennedy’s.
There are thirty-six different pairs of Justices that can be formed from the
set of nine, and only ten of the pairs have non-overlapping confidence
intervals.274
273 See, e.g., Segal et al., supra note 227, at 816 (providing a table with ideological scores
for Supreme Court Justices).
274 This is calculated as 9!/(7!×2!)=36. See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 44
(giving and explaining the formula for counting the number of possible unique subsets of a
given size from a group).
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TABLE 4: 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR BATTING AVERAGES










B. Analysis of 5-4 Decisions
Table 5 provides insight into the cases where the Court is divided
5–4.  Elementary counting techniques reveal that there are 126 different
possible combinations of five Justices from a group of nine.275  We have
196 observations on such divisions in the Court.  If we randomly as-
signed cases to each of the 126 different possible combinations, we
would expect most cells to have one or two observations.  The average
value is 196/126, which is 1.5556.  Clearly the actual assignments are not
random.  Based on Table 5, we can see that 74% of these close decisions
fell into one of three cells—the five conservatives voting together or one
of the two moderate conservatives voting with the four liberals.  Table 5
enumerates fourteen specific combinations of the 126 possible combina-
tions.  It shows incidences of unusual coalitions, such as each of the three
most conservative Justices voting with the four liberals, or each of the
liberal Justices voting with the most conservative Justices.  Table 5 also
reveals, however, that most of the possible coalitions never occurred.
275 This is calculated as 9!/(5!×4!)=126.
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O’Connor swing vote with 4 liberals 28
Kennedy swing vote with 4 liberals 24
Breyer votes with 3 most conservative and 1 moderate 2
Souter votes with 3 most conservative and 1 moderate 5
Ginsburg votes with 3 most conservative and 1 moderate 4
Stevens votes with 3 most conservative and 1 moderate 2
Rehnquist votes with 4 liberals 2
Thomas votes with 4 liberals 3
Scalia votes with 4 liberals 1
Breyer dissents with 3 most conservative 1
Souter dissents with 3 most conservative 2
Ginsberg dissents with 3 most conservative 2
Stevens dissents with 3 most conservative 1
By adding the frequencies of the fourteen cells in Table 5, we can
account for 166 of 196 cases.  This leaves only thirty remaining cases,
which indicates that there are at most thirty additional combinations or a
maximum of forty-five combinations out of the 126 possible.  Clearly
most of the possible combinations never happened.
Using more detailed information about the cases unaccounted for by
Table 5, we can construct a chi-square test statistic to test the hypothesis
that the assignments were random.276  The data for the thirty cases unac-
counted for in Table 5 reveals that there are only eighteen additional
combinations.  Twelve of these combinations are unique, two of them
had two occurrences, two of them had three occurrences, and one had
five occurrences.  Interestingly the combination that occurs five times is
the coalition of Scalia, Thomas, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.  It is too
unwieldy to create a table of all 126 possible combinations, or to list the
ninety-four combinations that never occurred, but some examples can be
given.  The coalition of Thomas, Stevens, Ginsburg, O’Connor, and Ken-
nedy never occurs in the 196 5–4 split decisions.  Neither does the coali-
tion of Thomas, Souter, Ginsberg, O’Connor, and Kennedy.
The chi-square test formally tests the null hypothesis that the combi-
nations of voting coalitions in 5–4 cases are randomly dispersed.277  If
276 See id. at 157–62 (explaining a chi-square test).
277 See id.
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the null hypothesis were true, the sum of the squared values of the ob-
served frequency of each cell’s coalition minus the cell’s expected value
under the random assignment hypothesis divided by the cell’s expected
value would have a chi-square distribution with 125 degrees of free-
dom.278  Expressed as an equation: S (f-1.5556)2/1.5556 is our test statis-
tic where f equals the observed cell frequency.279  In this data set, the
observed value of the chi-square test statistic is 5,862.26.  The critical
value for a chi-square with 125 degrees of freedom at 5% significance is
228.58, and at 1% significance is 243.86.280  The odds of observing the
distribution of voting coalitions that we see under the random assignment
hypothesis are astronomical.281  Of course, this is not surprising.  We
know that certain Justices tend to vote together on controversial issues,
but it is still informative to have some measure of the magnitude of the
departure from statistical independence in the voting of the Justices.
C. Logit Regressions
The next form of analysis is the most advanced model presented.
Logit regression is used to model the votes of one Justice as a function of
the other eight Justices.282  Ordinary regression, also known as least-
squares because it minimizes the sum of squared prediction errors, is a
technique that is known to most empirical researchers.283  Ordinary re-
gression is used to estimate relationships when the dependent variable is
continuous.284  In voting models the dependent variable is dichotomous,
278 There are 126 cells, but once we know the content of 125 of them we can determine
the 126th since the proportions must sum to one.  Hence there are only 125 degrees of free-
dom. Cf. id. at 158 (explaining that the sum of n independent squared standard normal random
variables has a c2 distribution with n degrees of freedom).
279 See id. at 157 (stating the formula in words).
280 These critical values are derived from Shazam software. See generally WHITE, supra
note 6, at 317–22 (explaining the calculation of critical values for common distributions).
281 According to Shazam software, the probability of getting a test statistic this large if the
null hypothesis is true is about 0.33×10-307. See id. (explaining the calculation of probabilities
for common distributions).
282 See generally FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 458–61 (explaining logit
regression).
283 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients
Justice?  An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE
FOREST. L. REV. 1235, 1285 (2006) (using ordinary least squares); cf. FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN,
supra note 22, at 350 (“Multiple regression is a statistical technique for estimating relation-
ships between variables that has . . . invaded the law. . . .  It is now so easy to fit models to data
by computer that multiple regression and related techniques are likely to become even more
widely used . . . .”).
284 This follows from the fact that lines are continuous functions, and regression models
assume a linear relationship between variables. See GREENE, supra note 153, at 10 (providing
the assumptions of the linear regression model).
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each vote is classified as a one or a zero, for or against.285  Applying
ordinary regression in this situation results in serious estimation
problems.286  Logit regression calculates the logarithm of the odds ratio
for a positive response.287  In this model the anti-log of the coefficients
on the explanatory variables represents the odds of the dependent Justice
voting with the majority, given the explanatory Justice voted with the
majority.288  The anti-log of a negative number is a value less than one,
meaning that a negative coefficient implies that the dependent Justice is
less likely to vote with the majority if the explanatory Justice voted with
the majority.289  The anti-log of a positive number is, of course, greater
than one, which means that a positive coefficient will increase the odds
that the dependent Justice votes with the majority if the explanatory Jus-
tice did.290
Logit regression assumes that the causation runs in one direction.291
Therefore, it is necessary to assume that the dependent Justice’s vote
does not affect the voting of the other Justices.  I begin the logit analysis
with an example using Justice Thomas’ voting record as the dependent
variable.  Justice Thomas is chosen because of the characterization of
him as a Scalia clone, and a loyal apprentice to Justice Scalia.292  Many
285 See, e.g., Christopher B. Colburn & Sylvia C. Hudgins, The Influence on Congress by
the Thrift Industry, 20 J. BANKING & FIN. 473, 477 (1996) (explaining that a vote for is as-
signed a value of one and a vote against is assigned a value of zero).
286 See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors
of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 348 n.166 (1999) (“Logistic regression was
used because where the dependent variable has a dichotomous outcome (here, trial or settle-
ment), ordinary least squares regression can not [sic] be used because the assumption that the
errors are homoskedastic is violated.”).
287 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 458.
288 See id. (“The coefficient is therefore referred to as the log odds ratio . . . and its anti-
log as the odds ratio or odds multiplier.”).
289 See id. at 458–59 (“For example, in a logistic regression involving success or failure
on a test, since the anti-log of -0.693 is 0.5, a coefficient of -0.693 for a protected group
implies that the odds on passing for a protected group are one-half the odds on passing for a
favored group member.”).
290 See Lederman, supra note 286, at 350 n.176 (“[I]f the log odds for a particular group
is 2.30, then cases with that feature are 2.30 times more likely to go to trial and opinion than
cases in the reference group (cases without that feature).”).  In the present study, the coeffi-
cient of Justice Rehnquist on Justice Thomas is 1.6017, the anti-log of which is 4.96.  So
Justice Thomas is nearly five times more likely to vote with the majority when Justice Rehn-
quist voted with the majority.  When Justice Scalia votes with the majority, Justice Thomas is
nearly sixty times more likely to vote with the majority.
291 See WONNACOTT & WONNACOTT, supra note 63, at 135–36 (explaining that a change
in the independent variable causes a change in the probability of the response variable).
292 See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice
Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931,
933 (2005) (“Justice Thomas has had his independence as a voter on the bench questioned,
with the suggestion that he bases his votes on those of a colleague, Justice Antonin Scalia.
Indeed, Justice Thomas has been referred to as ‘Scalia’s puppet,’ ‘Scalia’s clone,’ and even
‘Scalia’s bitch.’”) (footnotes omitted).
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commentators have dismissed the role of Justice Thomas on the Court,
complaining that he simply votes in tandem with other conservative jus-
tices on the bench.293  Other commentators claim that this characteriza-
tion is unfair;294 and indeed, the data in Table 2 could support the claim
of unfairness as it shows Justices Scalia and Thomas being the solo dis-
senters more than twice as often as six other Justices.  However, my po-
sition is neither to support nor attack the characterization of Justice
Thomas, but to use the fact that the characterization exists and is wide-
spread as a justification for assuming his voting to be the dependent vari-
able affected by the other Justices for the purpose of demonstrating the
use of a logit regression model.  Justice Thomas is also famous for not
asking his own questions during oral arguments, which could further jus-
tify initially modeling his voting as dependent on the other Justices.295
Logit regression was only applied to the cases in which all nine
Justices participated, there were 877 such cases, in order to avoid obser-
vations with missing data.296  The first column of Table 6 presents the
estimated coefficient for each Justice’s influence on Justice Thomas and
the associated t-statistic.  The t-statistic essentially measures whether the
estimated coefficient is statistically discernible from zero.297  A t-statistic
of 1.645 is statistically significant at the ten percent level; 1.96 is signifi-
cant at the five percent level; and 2.576 is significant at the one percent
level.298  The estimated coefficients for Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and
Breyer are highly significant, and the estimated coefficients for the other
five Justices are not near statistical significance.  The negative coeffi-
293 See Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (1997) (“Thomas has emerged as a distinctive member of the high court.  Thomas
has . . . articulated themes that distinguish him from all of the other Justices, including the
conservative colleagues who share his preferences in determining case outcomes.”) (footnotes
omitted).
294 See Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the Supreme
Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 351, 353 (2002) (“Some commentators have dismissed the role of Justice Thomas on the
Court, complaining that he simply votes in tandem with other conservative justices on the
bench.”).
295 See David A. Karp, Why Justice Thomas Should Speak at Oral Argument, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 611, 612–13 (2009) (documenting the low quantity of Justice Thomas’ comments during
oral arguments).
296 See Lederman, supra note 286, at 348 (“Multiple regression requires eliminating any
case that does not contain information on all of the independent variables used in a particular
run.”).
297 See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a small t-
statistic means the difference between two values is too small to eliminate random chance as
an explanation).
298 ANDERSON ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 240, at 200.
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cient for Justice Breyer indicates that his decisions influence Justice
Thomas to vote on the other side.299
TABLE 6: LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS—INFLUENCE OF JUSTICES
ON JUSTICE THOMAS
Justice Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Scalia 4.0766 13.636 4.0673 14.123





Breyer -2.2871 3.3846 -2.4343 3.8292
Ginsbug -0.68447 1.2073
The logit regression was repeated without the insignificant Justices.
The estimated coefficients for the three remaining Justices and their asso-
ciated t-statistics are reported in the last two columns of Table 6.  The
values do not change very much, and this suggests a finding that Justices
Scalia, Rehnquist, and Breyer influence Justice Thomas with respect to
the eight variable model and the three variable model.
In fairness to Justice Thomas, logit models were estimated with
each of the other eight Justices’ voting records as the dependent variable.
Note that it is not possible for all nine models to be simultaneously cor-
rect because each model assumes for the purposes of statistical inference
that the causation runs in one direction.  Still, the results contain interest-
ing findings.  Table 7 provides a summary of these logit regressions and
show how each Justices’ voting might be significantly positively af-
fected, significantly negatively affected, or unaffected by the other
Justices.
299 See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 458–59 (providing an interpretation for a
negative coefficient in a logit regression).
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Below Thomas Rehnquist Scalia O’Connor Kennedy Breyer Souter Ginsburg Stevens
Thomas — POS POS insig insig NEG insig insig insig
Rehnquist POS — POS POS POS insig insig insig NEG
Scalia POS POS — insig insig insig insig insig NEG
O’Connor insig POS insig — insig POS insig NEG NEG
Kennedy insig POS insig insig — insig insig insig POS
Breyer NEG insig insig insig insig — POS POS POS
Souter insig insig insig insig insig POS — POS POS
Ginsburg insig insig insig NEG insig POS POS — POS
Stevens insig NEG NEG NEG POS POS POS POS —
There are some statistical similarities between the three most con-
servative Justices (Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia).  Justice Thomas is
positively influenced by Justices Scalia and Rehnquist while negatively
influenced by Justice Breyer.  Justices Scalia and Rehnquist are each
positively influenced by the other two conservative Justices (O’Connor
and Kennedy) and negatively influenced by Justice Stevens.  Justice
Rehnquist is also positively influenced by Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor.  Justices O’Connor and Kennedy are both positively influ-
enced by Justice Rehnquist, but not by any other conservative Justice.
Justice Stevens has a positive influence on Justice Kennedy, but both
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg have a negative influence on Justice
O’Connor.
There is a conflict between the two women of the SRCE that is
statistically discernible.  Both women negatively influence each other
and Justice Stevens has an opposing influence on the two women.  Jus-
tice Ginsburg is positively influenced by Justices Souter and Breyer.
Justice Stevens is positively influenced by Justice Kennedy and the three
more liberal Justices (Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer).  Justice Stevens is
negatively influenced by Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia and
unaffected by Justice Thomas.  Justice Breyer is negatively influenced by
Justice Thomas.  Justice Breyer is also positively influenced by Justice
O’Connor and each of the three more liberal Justices.
Justice Souter’s statistics are interesting.  Justice Souter is positively
influenced by the three more liberal members of the court (Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer), but he is not negatively influenced by anyone.
Justice Souter and Justice Kennedy are the only members of the court
who are not negatively influenced by another Justice, although Justice
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Souter has more positive role models.  Justices Souter and Kennedy are
also the only members of the court who do not show a negative influence
on any other Justice; however, Justice Souter also has a positive effect on
more of the other Justices.  Justice O’Connor has a negative influence on
two Justices and Justice Stevens has a negative influence on three Jus-
tices.  The other five Justices exert negative influence on one other mem-
ber of the Court (Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia, Breyer, and Ginsburg).
Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and Breyer each affect four other Justices
positively.  Justices Ginsburg and Souter each affect three positively;
Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia each affect two positively; and
Justice O’Connor only has a positive influence on one (Rehnquist).  If
net influence is defined to be the number of Justices a Justice influences
positively minus the number influenced negatively, Justice O’Connor ac-
tually has a negative net influence.  The Justices with the largest net in-
fluence metric are Rehnquist, Breyer, and Souter, all tied at a net
measure of three.
The logit regressions also suggest that Justice Kennedy is, in one
sense, the most independent Justice.  His voting record is only statisti-
cally significantly affected by two other Justices, Rehnquist and Stevens.
Both Justices have a positive influence on Justice Kennedy, even though
Justice Rehnquist has a negative influence on Justice Stevens and Justice
Stevens has no statistically significant effect on Justice Rehnquist.
Table 8 provides the exact values of the statistically significant t-
statistics for the logit regressions.  All of the information in Table 7 is
contained in Table 8, but Table 7 makes visualization of the positive and
negative influences easier.  Table 8 provides the numerical values to al-
low readers to get a feel for the magnitudes of the significance levels.
Each logit regression was then replicated by removing the statistically
insignificant Justices from the regression.  In the interest of conserving
space, these results are not reported in Tables, but the statistical signifi-
cance of all the remaining Justices was preserved so the findings are
robust with respect to this choice of model specification.
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Below Thomas Rehnquist Scalia O’Connor Kennedy Breyer Souter Ginsburg Stevens
Thomas — 4.05 13.64 insig insig -3.38 insig insig insig
Rehnquist 4.14 — 3.54 5.14 6.45 insig insig insig -4.05
Scalia 13.76 3.18 — insig insig insig insig insig -2.21
O’Connor Insig 5.17 insig — insig 6.76 insig -2.62 -2.45
Kennedy Insig 6.52 insig insig — insig insig insig 3.36
Breyer -3.73 insig insig insig insig — 2.85 6.80 4.89
Souter Insig insig insig insig insig 3.57 — 8.47 5.30
Ginsburg Insig insig insig -2.19 insig 6.86 8.42 — 6.63
Stevens insig -4.33 -2.51 -2.58 3.73 5.26 4.90 6.47 —
It may be true that Justice Thomas is the least independent thinker.
By all measures of fit, Justice Thomas’ voting was the most predictable
based on the other Justices’ votes.  The logit regression correctly pre-
dicted his vote 93% of the time.  The Cragg-Uhler R-squared measure,
found in Table 9, contains a measure of goodness of fit for the logit
regressions for the nine Justices.300  The Justices have been listed in the
order of best fit, and the results demonstrate that the model fits Justice
Thomas better than any other Justice.301












300 See John G. Cragg & Russell S. Uhler, The Demand for Automobiles, 3 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 386, 400 n.20 (1970) (defining an R-squared measure for logit regressions).
301 The larger the R-square, the better the fit.  An R-square of 1.0 represents a perfect fit.
FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 22, at 369.
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D. Tests for Structural Change
It is reasonable to suspect that voting behavior changes over time.302
The Chow test is a statistical test for a change in regime that can be used
to test the null hypothesis that voting behavior is constant over time
against the alternative hypothesis that a structural change has oc-
curred.303  The procedure involves splitting the sample into two time pe-
riods and estimating three regressions—one regression for each
subperiod and a third regression which combines both periods.304  If the
sum of squared residuals does not change very much when the two peri-
ods are estimated individually, then the null hypothesis of no structural
change will be accepted.305  If the sum of squared residuals does change
by a large amount that is statistically discernible, then there is evidence
of a structural change.306
There is some evidence that the power (the probability of not mak-
ing a Type II error) of the test procedure can be increased by omitting
some of the observations in the middle.307  For these tests cases from
calendar year 1999 were excluded and the subsamples of decisions prior
to 1999 and decisions subsequent to 1999 were used.  I then calculated a
test statistic for the test of structural change for each of the nine logit
models.  These statistics have an F distribution with 9 degrees of free-
dom in the numerator (the number of regressors—each Justice plus an
intercept) and 788 degrees of freedom in the denominator (806 observa-
tions excluding 1999 and decisions with missing Justice votes less the 18
estimated coefficients—one for each Justice plus an intercept in two sep-
arate subsamples).308  Therefore, the critical values of the test statistic at
significance levels of ten percent, five percent, and one percent are
1.648, 1.900, and 2.432 respectively.309  The results of the tests are re-
ported in Table 10.
302 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 789 (“It has been suggested that a Jus-
tice’s judicial ideology might vary over his tenure . . . .”).
303 See GREENE, supra note 153, at 130 (explaining the Chow test for structural change).
304 See id. at 130–31 (describing the test procedure).
305 See id. at 131 (explaining that the test statistic is derived from the change in the sum of
squared residuals between the restricted and unrestricted regressions).
306 See GUJARATI, supra note 56, at 264 (stating that the hypothesis of no structural
change should be rejected if the test statistic is sufficiently large).
307 Cf. WHITE, supra note 6, at 173 (giving the statistician the option to exclude observa-
tions from the middle of the sample in conducting a Chow test).
308 See GUJARATI, supra note 56, at 263–64 (explaining how to calculate degrees of free-
dom for a Chow test). See generally NEWBOLD ET AL., supra note 266, at 242–43 (explaining
the degrees of freedom concept).
309 These critical values are derived from Shazam software. See generally WHITE, supra
note 6, at 317–22 (explaining the calculation of critical values for common distributions).
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TABLE 10: CHOW TESTS FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE










The p-value demonstrates what the significance level would have to
be to make the test statistic borderline significant.310  The lower the p-
value the more we are able to reject the null hypothesis of no change
with a very low probability of a Type I error.311  Alternatively, the lower
the p-value, the more statistically significant the test statistic is.312  These
tests indicate that only Justice Scalia has no statistically significant
change in voting relationships during the SRCE at any conventional level
of significance.  Of the other eight Justices, we can reject the null hy-
pothesis of no change at a ten percent level of significance (error rate) for
all; at a five percent level of significance for all but Justice Breyer; and at
a one percent level of significance for Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor,
Souter, Stevens, and Ginsberg.  The last finding is comparable to the
findings of Professor Landes and Judge Posner who reported statistically
significant shifts in ideology for Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Souter,
Stevens, and Ginsberg.313
CONCLUSION
Many of the empirical findings are already known and not surpris-
ing—Justices Kennedy and O’Connor were frequently the swing voters
during the SRCE, and most of the 5–4 decisions split along traditional
310 See ANDERSON ET AL., ESSENTIALS, supra note 240, at 231 (“[T]he p-value is also
called the observed level of significance.”).
311 See id. at 229 (“[A] small p-value indicates a sample test statistic that is unusual given
the assumption the H0 is true.”).
312 See Gross & Syverud, supra note 132, at 334 n.48 (“Note that the smaller the p-value
the greater the confidence that the results do not reflect mere chance fluctuations.”).
313 Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 790 n.16.
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conservative and liberal lines.314  However, there is incremental value in
having measures that reveal the precise degree to which these generaliza-
tions are true.315  Additionally, some of the conventional wisdom that the
swing voting Justices are the most important might not be true.316  The
logit models of voting suggest that the Justices with the greatest statisti-
cally significant net influence on other Justices were Rehnquist, Souter,
and Breyer.
I have endeavored to be somewhat more careful and more thorough
in my empirical analysis than I believe other scholars have been.  First,
this analysis is limited to a stable court so that any Justice’s voting record
is confined to a period when all other Justices were constant.  The Chow
tests reveal that even with the composition of the Court held constant,
there might be structural changes over time that makes modeling the
votes of the Court problematic.  Additionally I provide data on the fre-
quency of both unanimous cases and non-unanimous cases.  I report con-
fidence intervals that reveal the precision (or imprecision) of some of the
metrics.  I therefore can report that the batting averages across twenty-six
of thirty-six different possible pairs are not statistically discernible.
The chi-square statistic for the null hypothesis that the 5–4 deci-
sions were random reveals that the perceived division in the Stable Rehn-
quist Court was real and extremely large in statistical terms.  The logit
regressions also confirm that Justice Thomas is the most consistently pre-
dictable member of the Court based on the votes of the others.
The empirical analysis provides many insights about the Stable
Rehnquist Court, but it is not capable of determining which model of
voting best describes the Court: independent, cooperative, or vindictive.
The votes are not independent, but it is unknown whether the cause of
the statistical dependence is some exogenous variable outside the model,
or whether instead the Justices work cooperatively or vindictively.317
There is more positive influence between pairs of Justices than negative
influence, which can be interpreted as meaning that there is more cooper-
314 See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Looking Ahead: October Term 2006, 2005–2006 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 361, 367 (2005–06) (“Since he joined the Court in 1988, Justice Kennedy has
shared with Justice O’Connor the power of serving as ‘swing justice’ on most issues.”).
315 Cf. Christopher P. Guzelian et al., A Quantitative Methodology for Determining the
Need for Exposure-Prompted Medical Monitoring, 79 IND. L.J. 57, 96–97 (2004) (expressing a
preference for quantitative measures over qualitative expressions).
316 See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 17, at 40 (2008) (“[I]n theory the median Justice
should be quite powerful . . . .”).
317 See Ruger et al., supra note 8, at 1190–91 (2004) (explaining that observing ideology
related correlations in decision making does not mean that other factors are not the cause of the
relationships).
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ation than retaliation.318  However, the analysis can only examine rela-
tionships between individuals, not between blocks.  The methodology
employed cannot investigate whether blocks of Justices retaliate against
others.  Nevertheless, although the data cannot both determine the true
model and validate it, it does provide many informative metrics.319
Many individuals can look at the same data and come to opposing
conclusions.320  Data that student test scores improved from one year to
the next could be used to argue that teaching performance improved.321
Alternatively, the data could be used to argue that the teachers cheated
and gave students the answers to the test questions.322  There are enough
non-traditional coalitions in the data to dispel both notions of vindictive
and cooperative voting.  Although the voting patterns are clearly not ran-
domly dispersed, one should not expect them to be random because some
Justices can clearly be labeled as more or less conservative, and the votes
are expected to be correlated as a consequence of the fact that many
cases split along conservative and liberal ideologies.  Perhaps the empiri-
cal fact that should be emphasized is the simplest one—forty-four per-
cent of the decisions during the SRCE were unanimous—a high
percentage by twentieth century standards.323
318 See e.g., Justice Clarence Thomas, Remarks from the 100th Arkansas Bar Association
Convention, 51 ARK. L. REV. 651, 653 (1998) (describing cordial daily lunches amongst the
Justices and how well they all like each other).
319 See Leamer, supra note 62, at 36 (stating that data can reveal some information, but
data alone cannot reveal the full relationship between variables).
320 See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 12 (2005) (“The conventional wisdom is often
wrong.”).
321 See id. at 29 (“A dramatic one-year spike in test scores might initially be attributed to
a good teacher . . . .”).
322 See id. at 27–28 (“But if a teacher really wanted to cheat—and make it worth her
while—she might collect her students’ answer sheets and, in the hour or so before turning
them in to be read by an electronic scanner, erase the wrong answers and fill in the correct
ones.”).
323 See Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 790–91 (“[A]bout 30 percent of the Supreme
Court decisions in the 1937-2004 period were decided unanimously . . . .  The fraction of
unanimous decisions has been trending upward from around 30 percent in the 1960s, and is
now in the 40 percent range . . . .”).
